DGAPbericht
Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik
Nº 6
Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships
New Faces Conference 2006
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, Norway
20–22 October 2006
Security in a Globalized World
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is the national network for German foreign
policy. As an independent, non-partisan and non-profit organization, it actively takes part in the
political decision-making process and promotes understanding of German foreign policy and
international relations. More than 1800 members – among them renowned representatives from
politics, business, academia and the media – as well as more than 80 companies and foundations
support the work of the DGAP. The DGAP comprises the research institute, the journal IP and
its Global Edition and the library and documentation center.
The DGAP’s research institute works at the junction between politics, the economy and academia.
The research institute works interdisciplinary, policy-oriented and in all areas of German foreign
policy, which are anything but static in globalizing world: security and supply risks, international
competition, integration and network issues.
The DGAP publishes Germany’s most renowned foreign policy journal – INTERNATIONALE
POLITIK (IP). It provides a forum for the discussion of German foreign policy and major
international topics. IP Global Edition is the quarterly English-language magazine of the German
Council on Foreign Relations. It brings the missing European voice on global issues to readers
across the world and is essential reading for everyone who is working in the field of politics and
global economic issues.
The DGAP Library and Documentation Center (BiDok) is one of the oldest and most significant
specialized libraries in Germany open to the public. It holds substantial collections on German
foreign and security policy.
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) was established by the Norwegian
Parliament in 1959 in order to promote a better understanding of international issues in Norway.
NUPI has sought to achieve this by undertaking a wide range of research activities and by disseminating
information on international issues.
The Institute has an independent position in studying matters of relevance to Norwegian foreign
policy and economic relations. NUPI’s research programs include: International Politics, International
Economics, the Centre for Russian Studies, Development Studies, Training for Peace in
South Africa and a project group for studies of the Persian Gulf. As a small nation, Norway depends
strongly on stable and open ties to the rest of the world. Consequently, the understanding
of international relations and the constantly evolving international economy is a vital prerequisite
when the foreign, as well as domestic policy of Norway is to be shaped. With more than 40 years
of experience, NUPI is one of Norway’s leading independent centres for research and information
on political and economic issues.
Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck (eds )
Security in a Globalized World
Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships
New Faces Conference 2006
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
October 20–22, 2006
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Berlin 2007
With the support of:
Kompetenzbereich Wissenschaft und Technologie
New Faces Conference 2005
Security in a
Globalized World
Contents
Introduction 3
Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships . . . . . . . . 7
Foreword by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI
Panel I – Regional Security Cooperation: Current trends
Recent Trends in Research on Regional Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Martin Sjögren
It’s a Long Way to … Regional Strategic Actorness. Assessing the EU’s
Ongoing (R)Evolution in Strategic and Regional Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Claudia Major
A New Strategic Partnership? Deepening UN-NATO Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
Panel II – Chains of Interdependency: Coordinating
Regional/Global Energy Security
The Venezuelan Oil and Gas Hub: A Regional and Global Perspective of
Energy Supply and Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Gerardo J. Briceño P.
Panel III – Re-Inventing the Carrot: ENP as an Alternative to EU-Enlargement?
The ENP and the EMP: Exploring a Division of Tasks between
Overlapping Initiatives 53
Eduard Soler i Lecha
Panel IV – The Role of Regional Security Institutions and
Strategic Alliances in Asia
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Security Provider for Central Asia? . . . . . . . . . . 61
Natalia Touzovskaia
The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Necessity for Asian Strategic Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Rafeh A. Malik
Panel V – After the Roadmap: Cooperation between
Multinational Actors in the Middle East
Regional Security in the Middle East: Cooperation between Multinational and Regional Actors? . . . . 83
Mohamed Ibrahim
Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Emerging EU Alternative . . . . . . . . . 91
Stuart Reigeluth
Participants and Organizers 99
Introduction
New Faces Conference 2006
Introduction
The end of the Cold War brought with it the end of the traditional, bipolar
geo-strategic model of explaining world affairs. “Feindbilder,” which used to be
defined in geographical terms (“East” vs “West”), have been replaced by security
threats perceived to be truly global and functional in nature, yet regional in origin:
Terrorism and proliferation, migration, organized crime and corruption or, at the
root level, the lack of democracy and good governance in certain parts of this
world. The realization that in today’s globalized and interlinked world regional
conflicts can have global fallout has increased the need for policy analysts to better
understand the highly complex nature of different regional security dynamics.
For policy makers, the question is how to address regional security issues efficiently
and effectively.
In this context, regional security organizations such as NATO and the OSCE
have recently been joined in their efforts to promote peace and stability by other,
general-purpose or even economy oriented regional organizations. Such “securitization”
of agendas can be observed in the transformation of the European
Union and the development of its CFSP and ESDP, in the change of nature
of G7/8 summits, but also in the addition of significant security related dimensions
to the agendas of the Arab League, AU, OAS, ECOWAS, ARF and SADC,
among many others. Regional security cooperation has thus become an increasingly
important part of the larger debate on the “new regionalism,” and the question
of how to coordinate national, regional and international actors now features
as the key to successful regional integration and stability.
During DGAP’s 9th New Faces Conference entitled “Security in a Globalized
World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships,” participants
from 18 different countries and from all over Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Russia
and the US presented papers on how regional cooperation and strategic partnerships
between states, regional and international organizations as well as civil
society actors and the private sector contribute to enhance security. Divided into
five panels, these case studies aimed at closing a gap in current policy research,
which largely focuses on economic aspects of regional cooperation, thereby neglecting
the above-mentioned “securitization” of political and economic agendas,
institutions and fora.
The introductory panel gave a brief overview of recent trends in literature on
and practice of regional security cooperation.
New Faces Conference 2006
Introduction
Panel II addressed the issue of energy security, which now shapes the foreign
policy of states and results in strategic, if sometimes uneasy, partnerships and
alliances. Participants discussed ways to further coordinate energy security efforts
and promote stable energy systems at both regional and global levels.
Panel III focused on enlargement as the EU’s key instrument to project stability.
Given the current enlargement fatigue and the ongoing debate about the EU’s
limited absorption capacity, participants discussed the European Neighborhood
Policy as a potential alternative instrument to promote security and stability in the
EU’s neighboring and partner countries.
In Panel IV, participants discussed the role of regional security institutions,
strategic partnerships, alliances and other forms of regional and international
cooperation in Asia. They elaborated on the potential value-added of actors such
as ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF), the SAARC, the SCO and others vis-àvis
single-state global actors such as China, Russia and the US.
The Middle East, a volatile region with few and only formally existing regional
security institutions, took center stage in this conference’s final panel. Participants
discussed the prospects of the Barcelona framework, one of the very few truly
regional initiatives. Whether third party intervention could compensate for the
apparent lack of regional security cooperation, keeping in mind the limitations of
the UN, the Quartet and the EU as potential actors in the region, was also highly
debated.
The 9th New Faces Conference was jointly organized by the International Forum
on Strategic Thinking and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
(NUPI). It took place at NUPI’s premises in Oslo, Norway, on 20-22 October
2006. The academic program was complemented by social activities in and
around Oslo, as well as a festive dinner and a keynote speech by Nils Morten
Udgaard, one of Norway’s outstanding foreign policy commentators.
The International Forum on Strategic Thinking is DGAP’s main instrument for
promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of foreign and security
policy. It holds three major events per year: an International Summer School,
a New Faces Conference and an Expert Conference. New Faces Conferences
gather 20 promising young professionals and scholars pursuing an active career
We would like to thank NUPI for organizing this conference with us, and especially Sverre Lodgaard and Elana
Wilson for all their support, for sharing their insights and thoughts and for being wonderful hosts. We would also like
to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Ministry of Defence and
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division for their financial support.
Introduction
New Faces Conference 2006
in the field of foreign and security policy. Participants present their own research,
compare arguments and approaches, and share feedback and constructive criticism
through a forum of like-minded peers. Their diverse academic and regional
backgrounds create a stimulating atmosphere for open debate. This workshopstyle
format allows participants to intensely engage with each other, get to know
different perspectives and deepen their professional networks. Participants are
encouraged to pursue their own ideas and thinking, reflecting their national background,
work experience, academic education and area of specialization.
Following the conference, participants are given time to consider their peers’
feedback and revise their work for publication through DGAP. This volume
presents selected articles drafted by participants of the 9th New Faces Conference
and makes them available to the interested public. We hope that this volume will
proof to be a valuable contribution to the debate and literature on regional security
cooperation and encourage further research in this area.
Hans Bastian Hauck & Kathrin Brockmann
Participants of the 9th New Faces Conference gather at NUPI
New Faces Conference 2006
Sverre Lodgaard and Fritjof von Nordenskjöld address the “New Faces”
Security in a
Globalized World
New Faces Conference 2006
Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional
Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships
Foreword by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI
The issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism sometimes makes me think of
the old fable of the hare and the tortoise. The unilateralist hare, untrammeled
by obligation or by slower brethren, leaps swiftly and sometimes even elegantly
to his goal. The multilateralist tortoise has to totter along on not just four, but a
monstrous multiplication of legs (27 now in the EU, 26 in NATO), often trying
to walk in different directions. The familiar twist of the fable is that the tortoise
may, through sheer dull persistence, nevertheless arrive closer to the target in the
end. A nuance less often remarked on is that the tortoise’s natural protection is
much tougher and more resilient than the hare’s.
Multilateral groupings of the three basic different kinds—of regionally contiguous
states, of non-contiguous states, and (near-)global—have in fact shown an
excellent survival rate since the Second World War. Compared with the pre-war
period, disappearing institutions have been rather rare: an important recent
exception is the windup of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA, also called COMECON) and a less important one is
the mothballing of Western European Union (since its active functions passed to
the EU in 2000). Much more common have been the cases of institutions enlarging
themselves with strategically significant effect—ASEAN as well as NATO
and the EU—and of institutions with initially narrow competencies branching
out into different fields. Multifunctionalism as well as multilateralism seems currently
to be on the rise; and it is intriguing to note that cases of initially economic
or functional groupings branching out into security dimensions are easier to
find than the reverse. (The purely military regional pacts CENTO and SEATO
disappeared early in the post-war period, and neither the—otherwise remarkably
durable—Western alliance NATO nor Russia’s Comprehensive Security Treaty
Organization looks like breaking out of its “hard” carapace any time soon.) Such
a trend can be largely explained by the changing modern or post-modern conception
of “security,” which reduces the centrality and weight of the military dimension
to focus increasingly on issues at the interface of defence and economics
like proliferation, energy and environmental security. It may also be relevant that
the most powerful understandings, and real-life versions, of modern multilateralism
are those built on interpenetration between and common regulation of
internal communities (the “integrative” model), rather than just traditional stateto-
state ties. If “the family that prays together stays together,” the multilateral
New Faces Conference 2006
Security in a
Globalized World
group that spends resources and/or obeys laws together may be more likely to
stand together and to obey a collective interest in the longer run. On this reading,
recent attempts to revive a system of bilateral trade deals would be just as much
of a false track as the more egregious cases of use of unilateral force.
Returning to the security agenda, it seems hard to deny that successful regional
groupings have helped their members in many ways. They help to suppress risks
of conflict, to insulate any stubborn hotspots (like Northern Ireland), to design
systems and mobilize resources against transnational threats like terrorism and
natural hazards, and—increasingly often—to promote and consolidate good
governance and reform, not only in the state apparatus. These blessings may
more easily be counted by considering the many dangers and handicaps that face
regions without effective cooperative frameworks, such as the greater Middle
East, South Asia and North-East Asia (the China/Japan/Korea/Taiwan complex).
On the down-side, it is now better understood that even the most advanced
groupings can suffer repeated crises of confidence and disunity as collective
competence is pushed out into newer and tougher areas; and the EU, as the most
advanced model, has been the first but may not be the last to run into a barrier
of popular dissent and distrust.
Are there similar contradictions when it comes to the impact of organized regions
and other specialized groupings on security and welfare at the truly global
level? In the economic sphere, it can certainly be argued that regional groups
which shelter their own members against some of the pressures of globalization
may intrinsically distort the overall workings of comparative advantage and
competition, besides holding the power to block as well as promote global trade
negotiations. In security terms, however, there would seem to be clearer advantages
all round if an increasing number of regions can keep themselves peaceful,
gradually pacify any “black sheep” in their midst, export the capacity to help out
in other people’s crises, and develop models to minimize their exposure to universal
transnational threats. Last but not least, does regional solidarity contradict
the powerful twentieth-century idea of voluntary strategic partnerships between
larger and smaller powers from different continents who see their survival as
inter-linked? This issue is being played out right now in the evolutionary contest
between the EU and NATO, and there will no doubt be many twists and turns
before the lessons are clear. This writer’s best guess is that it will grow steadily
harder for the USA to sustain an incomplete, adversarial grouping in any given
region (China’s neighbors against China or Iran’s neighbors against Iran), and
easier to stabilize relations between any given outside power and a region that is
Security in a
Globalized World
New Faces Conference 2006
inclusive or “whole” in itself. The tortoise cannot mimic the hare’s style, but a
little self-restraint could help to keep the hare alongside the tortoise.
No special justification is needed for a seminar and volume dedicated to exploring
these issues. Our theoretical models for understanding different modes of security
cooperation have failed to keep pace with the re-imagining of security itself.
The strength of feelings, on both sides, about recent US excursions into unilateralism
(and occasional anti-institutionalism) has squandered energies that could
have been spent on an objective study of the outputs and outcomes, strengths
and weaknesses of various multilateral alternatives. It is a particularly interesting
experiment, however, to try to make up some of this lost ground by encouraging
a younger generation of thinkers—the “new faces” of this publication—to tackle
the subject at an early stage in their careers. At first sight, the vitality and confidence
associated with youth might seem closer to the drivers of unilateralism.
More significant, however, may be the facts that young thinkers deal more easily
with degrees of complexity that have baffled the preceding generation (whether
in IR or IT); that they still have the generosity to look for everybody-wins solutions;
and that they are not easily discouraged from attempting the impossible. All
those qualities will be needed if an increasingly globalized, and threatened, world
is to have any chance of exploiting the full future value of cooperation and partnership
in all their forms. The present volume offers inspiration for tackling the
task, and even more importantly, hope.
Elana Wilson and Kristin Haugevik from NUPI
New Faces Conference 2006 10
Security in a
Globalized World
During a stroll through the Vigeland Sculpture Park
Trends in Research on Regional
Security Cooperation
11
New Faces Conference 2006
Recent Trends in Research on
Regional Security Cooperation
Martin Sjögren
Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, and with a global competitive market as well
as the emergence of transnational security threats such as terrorism and international
crime, it is not surprising that cooperative frameworks have been established
in most regions in order to address these issues more effectively. Some
form of regional organization now exists in virtually every region, although the
formal frameworks that exist in South Asia and the Arab region do not actually
lead to much cooperation. There are, however, notable exceptions to this trend,
such as the Northeast Asian region.
As has been widely documented, regionalism experienced a resurgence during the
1990’s and is now commonly termed “new regionalism”. The new regional organizations
and already existing organizations that underwent further development
were designed to deal with a steadily growing range of issues. Although economic
cooperation has remained the dominant issue for a lot of these organizations,
cooperation in the field of security was a goal of several of them from the outset
and has been a continuing development for others.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term
“region.” Geography is of course an important determinant for the demarcations
between various regions, with continents forming natural regional borders. As
the current debate about the further expansion of the European Union (EU) to
countries such as Turkey reveals, however, these regions are also to a large extent
political constructs. This is further demonstrated by the fact that some of the
larger world powers, such as the US, Russia, and China, play an influential role in
several of these regions simultaneously.
This paper begins by discussing recent research on the topic of regional security
cooperation, of its gaps and of the efforts being made to fill them. The second
part of the paper addresses possible areas for future research, focusing on the
See Louise Fawcett/ Andrew Hurrell (eds.). Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International
Order, New York, 1995.
Significant security-related cooperation has also taken place at the sub-regional level, especially in Europe, Africa, and
to a lesser extent in Latin America. It is assumed that much of the analysis in this paper applies to both regional and
sub-regional frameworks.
Martin Sjögren
New Faces Conference 2006 12
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
question why regional security cooperation has failed to develop in some regions,
paying particular attention to Northeast Asia.
Research on Regional Security Cooperation
There has been a significant amount of research conducted on the theme of
regionalism in international politics, as well as on regional cooperation. Although
some of this research was done during the Cold War, most of it coincided with
the so-called “new regionalism” of the post-Cold War era. The majority of this
research has looked at economic cooperation and the role of regional groupings
in the globalized international political economy.
However, some research has also been conducted on issues of regional security.
This research generally falls within one of two categories. The first category,
which was developed in the early 1990’s, focuses on regions as security entities
within the international security system. This research has taken issue with Realists,
who tend to view states as the predominant actors in international relations,
as well as Globalists, for whom states are losing their importance in an increasingly
globalized world. The new research emphasizes regions as primary arenas
for security. Perhaps most important among these is the work by Barry Buzan
and Ole Waever and their concept of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). The
central premise of their theory contends that the world is divided into a number
of regions, and that most security concerns and activities are internal to these
regions rather than global in nature.
The second category of research takes a different approach, focusing instead on
specific regions and the security dynamics and patterns of cooperation within
them. Within this body of research there is a substantial and growing amount of
literature focusing specifically on regional security cooperation. This has been
the case with Europe in particular, where much research has been carried out on
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as well as on other organizations
such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although this research
provides a lot of insight into security cooperation taking place in Europe, its
contribution to the comparative understanding of regional security cooperation
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 2003, chapter
3.
See Pål Jonsson. The Development of the European Security and Defense Policy: An Assessment of Preferences,
Bargains and Outcomes, Stockholm 2006, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1967.pdf>.
For a recent assessment of the OSCE, see Pál Dunay. The OSCE in Crisis (Chaillot Paper no. 88), Paris 2006. <http://
www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai88.pdf>.
Trends in Research on Regional
Security Cooperation
13
New Faces Conference 2006
elsewhere in the world is limited because of the peculiarities of European organizations—
notably their advanced nature and multiplicity.
Indeed, recent literature on regionalism and regional cooperation lacks theoretical
and comparative studies of the forms and tasks of regional security cooperation.
This gap is unfortunate given the increasing involvement of regional organizations
in security affairs and the aspirations of more distant regions towards developing
such frameworks.
In an effort to bridge this gap in the literature, a series of recent and forthcoming
publications by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
has sought to categorize the current forms of regional security cooperation, as
well as establish criteria for assessing the impacts of various regional groupings.
There are four general patterns and functions of regional organizations in the
field of security. Firstly, these regional organizations serve as frameworks for security
dialogue for conflict prevention and management, either indirectly or more
actively through the establishment of field missions, as in the case of the OSCE,
or by sending peacekeepers, as in the case of the African Union. A second
general pattern is that regions have developed new forms of military cooperation,
which place more emphasis on dialogue and cooperation than on traditional
arms control. Examples of this, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP)
and ESDP, have developed cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping, and even peace enforcement.
The third new pattern of regional security cooperation has been a growing commitment
to the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is perhaps most
obvious in Europe, where a number of organizations, such as the Council of
Europe and the OSCE, actively work to promote democracy among their member
states. The European Union has also specified strict democratic requirements
for membership, and has also made efforts to promote democracy beyond its
borders. Promoting democracy among their members has also been an important
task of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU),
while other regional organizations, such as those in the Asia-Pacific, have been
more cautious in this regard.
A fourth and final new trend in regional security cooperation has been the effort
to address the so-called “new threats” encompassing the broader security agenda.
Several of the regional groupings have developed more comprehensive security
Alyson J. K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey. Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century, SIPRI Yearbook
2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford 2006; Bailes and Cottey (eds.). Regional Security
Cooperation In the Twenty-first Century, Oxford, (forthcoming).
New Faces Conference 2006 14
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
concepts, attempting to address such disparate issues as energy security and violent
non-state actors, particularly those involved in terrorism. Such cooperation
can grow naturally out of cooperation in the economic sphere, even for groupings
with no previous specific security agenda. Examples of this are the Mercado
Común del Sur’s (MERCOSUR) and the Association of South East Asian Nations’
(ASEAN) policies on both terrorism and piracy.
Apart from these efforts to categorize the new patterns and functions of regional
security cooperation, recent research has also attempted to establish criteria for
evaluating whether regional groupings have positive aims and effects. Although
regional groupings such as the EU and NATO have generally had positive effects
for their member states, this was considered necessary since other groupings, like
the Warsaw Pact, have been largely detrimental for many of their constituent
members. Five such criteria have been suggested: whether cooperation is coerced
and hegemonic; whether it is based on a zero-sum relationship with the outside
world; whether it is rigid or static; whether it is artificial and superficial; and
whether its management and resource use is inefficient. One region in which the
newly formed regional groupings may have “failed” on several of these counts
is in the former Soviet Union. Groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are to
a great extent dominated by their larger member states (Russia in the case of the
CSTO, Russia and China in the case of the SCO), have largely undemocratic practices
and are often seen as trying to “block” US or Western strategic influence.
As has been demonstrated in this section, research relevant to regional security
cooperation is being conducted (although not thoroughly enough) and efforts are
being made to fill gaps in this research. But the research in this field still remains
underdeveloped. The following section suggests possible areas that require further
exploration.
Further Research Areas
Despite attempts to address gaps in the research on regional security cooperation,
much research still needs to be done in this important field in order to fully understand
its implications and potential. As a starting point, all new security-related
patterns and functions mentioned above need to be explored further, especially
if the roles and functions played by regional security organizations continue to
develop in these areas. A number of other possible research directions could be
For an elaboration on these criteria, see A. J. K. Bailes and A. Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 215–218.
A. J. K. Bailes, Vladimir Baranovsky, and P. Dunay. Regional Security Cooperation in the Former Soviet Area, forthcoming
in: SIPRI Yearbook, 2007.
Trends in Research on Regional
Security Cooperation
15
New Faces Conference 2006
pursued as well, such as the interactions between these regional groupings and
the wider implications of security regionalism for global governance.
One such area that requires further research, and which the rest of this paper
will attempt to address, is why regional cooperation has not taken root in certain
regions or sub-regions. These under-regionalized areas often have plenty of internal
security problems, which in a globalized world have implications far beyond
the region’s borders. Many examples can be mentioned in this regard, such as the
greater Middle East, where organizations like the Arab League remain very weak
and the Gulf Cooperation Council is both weak and potentially divisive, and
South Asia, where the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) has failed to develop into the effective regional organization many
hoped it would. This section will, however, seek to explore this question in relation
to Northeast Asia, where analysts increasingly speculate that security threats
such as those posed by North Korea, as well as tensions among other states in
the region, can only be addressed through institutionalized regional cooperation.10
Several factors may explain why certain regions have not been able to develop
strong frameworks for regional security cooperation.11 Firstly, regions with a clear
power discrepancy among their states have tended to develop weaker institutions,
since the smaller states suspect that such an organization would be dominated by
the larger state(s). This pattern holds true in Latin America, where the OAS has
remained weak due to the overwhelming power of the US, as well as in South Asia,
where smaller states such as Sri Lanka remain wary of the intentions of the much
larger India. NATO does, however, stand out as a notable exception to this trend.
Differences in size and power largely explain the problems with regional cooperation
in Northeast Asia. Most obviously, the size of China makes other states in
the region wary of its intentions and possible influence. This has not only been
the case with states such as Japan, but also with North Korea, for whom China
remains the closest ally. North Korea has attempted to gain increasing independence
from China, largely due to lingering mistrust stemming from the perceived
Chinese ideological betrayal through market liberalization and rapprochements
with South Korea and the USA.12
For more on regionalism in South Asia, see A. J. K. Bailes (ed.), Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy, SIPRI Policy
Paper (forthcoming).
10 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Sjögren. Confidence-building Measures on the Korean Peninsula during and after a
Peace Process (forthcoming SIPRI publication).
11 Bailes and Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 219–221.
12 Peter M. Beck and Nicholas Reader, China and North Korea: Comrades Forever? (Part 2), in: Korea and World Affairs,
Summer 2006, pp. 201–237.
New Faces Conference 2006 16
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
The other power with disproportionate influence in the region is the USA, especially
in relation to its allies South Korea and Japan. Tension has been growing
here, too, especially between the US and South Korea due to the latter’s efforts to
implement a more independent foreign policy. The discrepancy between the approaches
of both states towards dealing with North Korea, coupled with mounting
public discontent over the presence of American military bases in South
Korea, has caused the USA-South Korea alliance to come under increasing strain.
Another related factor that may explain the lack of security cooperation in certain
regions is adversarial intra-regional relations. Regions with low levels of tension
among their states have normally been more successful in establishing cooperative
security frameworks, as was the case in Western Europe following the Second
World War. Conversely, regions with higher levels of tension among two or more
key players, such as South Asia and the Middle East, lack such frameworks. This
explanation also applies to the case of Northeast Asia. There is not only obvious
tension between North Korea and almost all the states in the region. Territorial
disputes are still very much alive, such as those between Japan and Russia over
the Kurile Islands and between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo Island. In addition
to this, a long-standing rivalry persists between Japan and China, stemming
partly from historical events, but also from growing competition between the two
states for regional supremacy.
As the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in the 1970s–80s demonstrates, however, such high levels of tension
may not necessarily be a barrier to developing security cooperation, as long as
the region is clearly divided into two blocs. Although never to the same extent as
in Europe during the Cold War, this may have partly been the case in Northeast
Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, however, tensions have emerged within the
respective blocs. As we have seen, China and North Korea have been drifting
further apart, especially since the revival of international concern over North
Korea’s nuclear policies. Relations between the USA and South Korea have also
been weakening. This lack of a clear bloc structure has made the region all the
more complex, undermining efforts at building regional security cooperation.
Historical reasons may also explain the lack of regionalism in Northeast Asia.
Most importantly, the region does not have any past experience of regional cooperation.
Relations between the states in the region, as in East Asia as a whole,
have traditionally been conducted on a bilateral basis. Until now, the USA has deliberately
cast its own key Asian relationships in that form. Although all states in
the region (including North Korea) now take part in the meetings of the ASEAN
Trends in Research on Regional
Security Cooperation
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New Faces Conference 2006
Regional Forum (ARF) and most are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) framework and the new East Asian Summit grouping, a strong
commitment to the values of regional cooperation has not yet taken root, and
multilateral activities have hardly penetrated the spheres of security and democracy-
building. Added to this lack of experience of cooperation is the historical
legacy of war and colonization in the region. Japan’s colonization of the Korean
Peninsula, as well as its invasion of China during the Second World War, still
cause tension. This is evident from the frequent disputes over Japanese textbooks,
the issue of Korean “comfort women,” and the tensions erupting over former
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine.
Do all these negative factors indicate that Northeast Asia and regions with similar
problems will likely fail in their efforts at regional security cooperation? The current
situation does not look promising, especially in light of North Korea’s nuclear
tests on October 9th, 2006. However, discernible trends in the region hint
at a brighter future. Firstly, several states in the region have expressed the desire
to establish such regional structures. This is most notably the case in China and
South Korea, but more recently the USA has also made motions in this direction.
Secondly, there are signs that bilateral relations between the states in the region
may improve. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, chose Beijing and
Seoul as the destinations for his first official visits abroad, raising hopes that
Japan’s relations with China and South Korea may improve. Indeed, if anything
Discussants Matthieu Briens and Kristin Haugevik follow Martin Sjögren’s presentation
New Faces Conference 2006 18
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
positive may come out of the North Korean nuclear tests, it could be that states
in the region will realize that regional cooperation offers the best hope of addressing
the common threat posed by North Korea. A new commitment to such
cooperation was manifested by the relatively quick adoption of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea.
Regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia would greatly benefit both the
region itself and international security as a whole if it follows the criteria outlined
earlier as closely as possible. Threats emanating from the region, as well as from
other under-regionalized regions such as the Middle East, have truly global consequences,
especially in the case of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, looking at
the benefits other regions have gained from such cooperation, a framework for
regional security cooperation seems like the most promising long-term solution
to the region’s security problems.
Conclusion
The trend towards increased regionalism in world politics that arose during
the 1990’s lost its momentum and appeal a couple of years ago. The first Bush
administration was in many ways outright hostile towards regional groupings, preferring
to conduct its foreign relations bilaterally or through ad hoc “coalitions of
the willing”. Furthermore, the most advanced of the regional organizations, the
EU, was in crisis following the failure to adopt its constitution. However, several
recent developments seem to indicate that the trend is again turning towards
increased enthusiasm for regional cooperation. Foremost among these developments
is a change in US policy, as outlined in the revised National Security Strategy
of March 2006, which expresses support for regional and global cooperative
institutions.13 Moreover, the ESDP has continued to develop despite the lack of
a European constitution. Other regional organizations have gained in popularity
and influence as well. Both India and Pakistan have expressed interest in joining
the SCO.
This revived enthusiasm indicates that regional cooperation is likely to continue
to flourish and develop into an integral part of the international system. As this
paper has attempted to demonstrate, some research is currently being conducted
on this topic. This research does, however, remain underdeveloped. It is therefore
essential that it become the subject of further research in order to improve
understanding of its various dynamics and impacts.
13 The US National Security Strategy of March 2006 states that “relations must be supported by appropriate institutions,
regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching,” <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.
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It’s a Long Way to … Regional Strategic Actorness.
Assessing the EU’s Ongoing (R)Evolution in
Strategic and Regional Affairs
Claudia Major
Introduction
For a long time, the European Union (EU) has been considered an economic
giant but political dwarf. Yet at least since the inception of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU aimed at establishing itself as an actor in international
politics, thereby striving to complement its economic weight with political
influence. This paper assesses the progress the EU has made in the realm of
security and defense with regard to its ability to promote itself as a strategic actor.
It claims that despite criticism, draw backs and remaining challenges, the EU has
considerably advanced in its development towards becoming a European strategic
actor.
I would like to thank the participants of the 9th New Faces Conference in Oslo, October 2006, as well as Christian
Moelling and Mike Adkins for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Claudia Major
Opening Session with Fritjof von Nordenskjöld, Martin Sjögren, Sverre Lodgaard, Claudia Major
and Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
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Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
The EU is a unique political entity in that it is less than a state, but more than
an international alliance. CFSP and ESDP are located in the second, intergovernmental
pillar of the EU. They are thus subject to unanimous decision-making,
which assures great influence of the nation states. Given these particular
preconditions, to what extent can the EU be expected to develop into a strategic
actor capable of unified and efficient actions? Moreover, how to assess the EU’s
actorness? Is there not a self fulfilling prophecy of “non actorness” if one tries
to assess the EU’s strategic actorness with the help of criteria usually applied to
nation-states?
This paper first defines the terms of analysis, that is, “strategy” and “actorness”,
and outlines criteria to assess strategic actorness. Second, concrete achievements
of the EU will be discussed. The paper concludes with suggesting policy recommendations
on how to further the EU’s strategic development.
Defining the Beast: What Strategy, What Actor?
Strategy and strategic actorness are currently highly fashionable terms, and their
sloppy and inflationary use easily obscures their meaning. The unique context of
the EU as a political entity sui generis requires the thorough definition of both
terms with regard to the EU.
Strategy
The term derives from the Greek word strategos, which referred to a “military
commander” during the age of the Athenian Democracy. It describes a long
term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal, as opposed to tactics or
immediate actions. By defining the theory and practice of the use and threat of
the use of organized force for political purposes, a “strategy” provides a bridge
between political and military spheres. Beyond its military connotation, the term
is now increasingly employed to describe the art of developing, applying, and
coordinating the instruments of security policy, such as diplomatic, economic,
military, and informational tools, to achieve objectives that contribute to the security
of the issuing body.
Traditionally, strategies were double state-centred, in that they (1) focussed on
defending state interests but neglected trans-national and intra-state security
There are some areas in CFSP/ESDP where decisions can be taken with Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), such as
the nomination of Special Representatives or the implementation of Joint Actions or Common Positions once they
have been adopted.
Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: the logic of war and peace, Cambridge 1987, p. 248 f.
John Baylis, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, James Wirtz, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic
Studies, Oxford 2002; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford 1999.
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issues, and (2) were issued by nation states. This was challenged by the growing
importance of collective security organizations, such as NATO, and forms
of political integration, such as the EU, that also issued strategies to define their
security objectives and instruments. Applied to the EU, a strategy is here considered
a “policy making tool, which, on the basis of the values and interests of the
EU, outlines the long term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic
categories of instruments to be applied to that end.”
Strategic actorness
If a strategy is the art of co-ordinating all economic, diplomatic, and military
resources and policies available to an entity to achieve agreed goals, then, put simply,
a strategic actor is the agent who emits and implements these strategies.
There are numerous attempts to define “European strategic actorness”, or “strategic
culture” as precondition of strategic actorness. Bretherton and Vogler
define five criteria:
– shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles;
– the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies;
– the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system;
– the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments;
– domestic legitimating of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external
policy.
However, several authors have recently insisted that the ability to use and the
actual use of force are core elements of actorness. Edwards and Cornish stress
the “political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy
military force, coupled with the external recognition of the EU in the military
sphere” as defining element of a European strategic culture that paves the way
for European actorness. For Matlary, strategic actorness requires that both criteria—“
the ability to threaten the use of force […] and the ability to actually deploy
such force”—are fulfilled.10 If the EU is to be effective as foreign policy actor be-
Such as the NATO Concept (1999) and the European Security Strategy (2003).
Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.
Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler: The European Union as a Global Actor, London 1999; Paul Cornish, Geoffrey
Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report, in: International Affairs, No. 4/2005,
pp. 801–820; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003,
Manchester 2004; Janne Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?, in:
Security Dialogue, No. 1/2006, pp. 105–121.
Bretherton, Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (fn. 7), pp. 38–42.
Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.
10 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn. 7), p. 112.
New Faces Conference 2006 22
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yond the candidate countries (over whom it has economic and political coercion)
it must be able to deploy coercive diplomacy, which in fine includes not only the
existence but precisely the deployment of military force.
Drawing upon these definitions, three main criteria will guide the following
analysis. A strategic actor can be assessed through (1) its capacities for strategic
decision making; (2) the means at its disposal; and (3) the implementation of
policies.11
1) A strategic actor must dispose of the capacities especially for:
– common threat analysis
– decision making
– representation and negotiation
– implementation.
This enables for the formulation of common policies (such as in form of strategic
documents or ad hoc policy decisions) that are consistent with the common
ground of values and political priorities.
2) A strategic actor requires the means and resources to implement its strategies
and decisions. This criterion assesses the availability of, and capacity to use, the
relevant policy instruments available at the EU level, that is, civilian, police and
military capabilities. Besides civilian crisis management tools, this includes the
ability to threaten the use of force, and to employ it.
3) Is the EU able to implement its strategies? Put simply: is the EU able to act?
Evaluating the implementation of policies will offer pointers to assess the effectiveness
of a strategic actor.
These three criteria will now be applied to the EU.
Is There Strategic Actorness? Assessing Recent Achievements of the EU
The EU is a comparatively young actor in terms of security. Although the European
Political Co-operation was already created in the 1970s, the EU only
sharpened its foreign and security policy profile in the 1990s with the inception
11 It is worth mentioning that strategic actorness includes an internal and an external dimension. Internally, a strategic
actor must be capable to develop, implement and monitor strategies and dispose of the necessary resources for that.
Externally, it must gain recognition as actor. This analysis focuses on the internal dimension. The external dimension
can be assessed through an analysis of its international / external recognition and perception.
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of CFSP and ESDP. This witnesses not only the development of the EU from a
security consumer to a security provider. It also reflects the move from a military
dominated definition of security towards a comprehensive security concept
including social, economic and environmental dimensions—areas where the EU
had experience and tools to offer, as compared to other international actors, such
as NATO, or the nation states.12 To what extent can thus the EU be considered a
strategic actor?
Capacities
With the inception of CFSP and particularly ESDP, the member states intended
to equip the EU with capacities of strategic analysis, decision making, representation
and negotiation. New institutional settings were created within the Council.13
This included the Secretariat General with its nine Directorates Generals; the services
located under direct authority of the High Representative (HR), such as the
Policy Unit and the EU Military Staff (EUMS); decision-making entities run by
the member states, such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political
and Security Committee (COPS); and the Secretary General/HR himself, Javier
Solana.14 By putting at HR Solana’s disposal staff and instruments for developing
European positions and policies and for monitoring their implementation, the
member states laid the basis for an increasingly unified European actorness.
In terms of strategy, the first EU documents have been published by the Council
in 1999 on Russia and Ukraine.15 The development of a general European
security strategy however turned out to be rather controversial. Following the
inception of ESDP, the member states decided to push through those elements
on which agreement could be found. Accordingly, institutional settings were built
up and common military capabilities were envisaged. However, in view of ongoing
dissent between member states on strategic topics, such as over the degree of
autonomy the EU should strive for with regard to NATO and US, the strategic
dimension was deliberately left vague.16 Once initiated, it was hoped, the ESDP’s
“finalité” would become obvious from the context. However, far from that, the
12 Sven Biscop, Rik Coolsaet, The World is at stage—A global security strategy for the European Union (Notre Europe
Policy papers, No. 8/2003), December 2003, <http://www.notre-europe.asso.Fr/IMG/pdf/ Policypaper8.pdf>; Sven
Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.
13 It is worth reminding that the Commission already disposed of capacities and experience in some areas that the CFSP
and ESDP now were to be responsible of, mainly crisis management.
14 The first High Representative was nominated in 1999, at the Cologne European Council, Germany, see: Presidency
Conclusions. Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).
15 European Council: Common Strategy on Russia, 4 June 1999, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/
com_strat/russia_99.pdf> (01/06/2006); European Council: Common Strategy on Ukraine, 11 December 1999,
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf> (01/06/2006).
16 Alyson J. K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History (SIPRI Policy Paper, N° 10), February
2005; Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy (fn. 12).
New Faces Conference 2006 24
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Security Cooperation
emphasis on capacities and types of operation rather than policy goals created
what Bailes labelled a “conceptual gap.”17
It was only closed in 2003 with the publication of the European Security Strategy
(ESS).18 Building upon a common threat analysis, the ESS outlines main objectives,
challenges and principles of EU foreign action. However, it remains vague
about how these should be achieved. While this allows the EU to maintain a
wide margin for manoeuvre, it also threatens to render the ESS something of a
“strategic junk room.”19 Meanwhile, regional and sectoral strategies have further
developed the ESS. For example, in 2003 a “Strategy against the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction”20 was adopted and in 2005, the British EU presidency
proposed an “EU Strategy for Africa.”21
Finally, the ESS also raised, if only indirectly, the profile of the Secretary General
and his supporting institutions. The General Secretariat considers Solana’s intensified
travel agenda, as well as the broadened thematic and geographic diversity
of his engagements, to be the translation of the ESS into every day political
life.22 Moreover, thanks to its leading role in drafting the ESS, the Policy Unit
positioned itself as the coordinating body of European strategic thinking. The
member states became used to the idea of the Council playing a role in foreign
and security policy and to the idea of “strategies” at the EU level, and “they were
looking (more and more exclusively) to Solana and his team to produce them.”23
17 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. 4.
18 A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/
uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (01/01/2006). The unique context of the genesis of the ESS between Iraq war,
looming eastern enlargement of the EU and growing transatlantic divergences, such as in form of the National
Security Strategy of the Bush government, as well as it unique drafting process, cannot be discussed here. For further
details see Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16); Erich Reiter, Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU, in: Thomas
Jäger, Alexander Höse, Kai Oppermann (eds.), Die Sicherheitsstrategien Europas und der USA, Baden-Baden 2005,
pp. 57-65; Jean-Yves Haine, Idealism and power: The new EU Security Strategy, in: Current History, March 2004,
pp. 107–112; Klaus Becher, Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European
Security Strategy, in: European Security, Winter 2004, Special Issue: Old Europe, new Europe and the future of the
transatlantic security agenda, pp. 34 5–359.
19 Claudia Major, Henning Riecke, Europe’s little blue book. More strategic debate in the EU, in: Internationale Politik—
Transatlantic Edition, No. 2/2006, pp. 44 –51; Caroline Pailhe, Une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur: Un concept
stratégique utile mais dangereux (Note d’Analyse du GRIP, GRIP DATA : G2077), 6 January 2004, via <http://www.
grip.org> (01/08/2005).
20 Council of the European Union: EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels, December
2003, 15708/03, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf> (01/02/2006).
21 Council of the European Union: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 2005,
December, EU 15961/05 (Presse 367), <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/communications/docs/
the_eu_and_africa_towards_a_strategic_partnership_european_council_15_16_12_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100>
(10/11/2006).
22 Major, Riecke, Europe’s little blue book (fn. 19).
23 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. 5.
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To sum up, with the integrated structures of the Council, such as the Secretariat
General or the EUMC, the EU disposes of the institutional settings for common
threat analysis and decision making. The ESS and other regional and sectoral
strategies bear witness to this capacity. However, in their “broadness,” these
strategies also mark the confines of strategic thinking within the limits of intergovernmentalism
and unanimity,24 a confinement also perceptible in the work and
influence of the institutions. Besides the unanimous decision-making process,
the difficult balance of power between the member states in institutions like the
EUMC also impact upon the rapidity of decision-making and limits the probability
that a common position be reached.
In addition, the development of both the institutions and the strategic documents
seems to be at least partly crisis driven, i. e. reactive but not pro-active. The
Kosovo crisis helped putting the inception of ESDP on the agenda. The Iraq
crisis did not cause the ESS, but certainly encouraged the EU member states to
think about common strategic objectives.
Policy Means and Resources
The inception of ESDP, while the Kosovo war was still going on, reflects the
agreement that the EU cannot do without its own military capabilities. ESDP
was created in order to give the EU the “capacity for autonomous action, backed
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”25 In December 1999, the
member states agreed upon the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) which aimed at
establishing a “European Rapid Reaction Force” composed of 60,000 troops,
deployable in 60 days and sustainable for one year, to be operational in 2003.26 It
became quickly evident that the target would not be met, even if, in 2001, a more
cautious and realistic time table had been established. The EU has since redesigned
its guidelines for force structures and planning. In June 2004, the Headline
Goal (HG) 2010 had been drawn up, in which the EU stated its intent to develop,
beyond the corps-size structure of the HHG, small, self contained and quickly
deployable “battle groups.” These 1500 man strong units, to be deployable in 15
days and sustainable for about 30 days, are fully operational since January 2007.27
24 There are some exceptions. Once a general agreement on the deployment of a mission has been reached, particular
aspects of its implementation can for example be decided upon with majority voting.
25 Presidency Conclusions. Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).
26 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/
conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#external> and <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/
en/ec/ACFA4C.htm> (01/02/2006).
27 Headline Goal 2010. Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May and endorsed by the
European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>
New Faces Conference 2006 26
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
In view of improving intra-European co-ordination, the European Defence
Agency (EDA) was set up in 2004. The EDA should assist the EU in the development
of defense capacities and strengthen the European defense industrial
dimension. Beyond being an armament acquisition institution, the EDA should
encourage the member states to make serious commitments in order to meet the
HG 2010.28
In terms of civilian capabilities, the EU defined, at the Feira European Council in
June 2000, four main areas where capacities should be developed: police, judiciary,
civilian administration and civil protection.29 Most of these requirements
have been met. The civilian dimension is constantly evolving, as demonstrated
for example by the inception of the European Security and Intelligence Force
(ESIF) in 2001. Composed of up to 5000 police officers, the ESIF should be able
to conduct preventive and repressive action in support of international peace
keeping missions.30 Another example is the adoption, in 2004, of the Civilian
HG 2008, which defines targets regarding police force and civilian personnel.31
Its parallel formulation with the military HG 2010 underlines the comprehensive
security approach of the EU, linking military and civilian means.
To sum up, there are military, police and civilian capabilities at the disposal of the
EU. However, the translation of political declarations into material capabilities is
often not only slow but unsatisfying, as witnessed by the limited implementation
of the HHG. Ultimately, the strength of the EU military capabilities depends
upon the commitment of the member states. In fact, there is a lot of activity—
but very little result. Besides a lack of political will, the soft governance mechanisms
in CFSP / ESDP—mainly the decision-making structure based on unanimity
in the intergovernmental pillar and the lack of sanctions mechanisms at
the EU level—contributes considerably to this weak performance.32 In terms of
capabilities, this eventually risks undermining the credibility of the EU as a whole,
in that the weak performance creates an increasing gap between the EU’s strategic
expectations on the one hand and available crisis management capabilities on
(01/09/2006); Christian Moelling, EU–Battlegroups. Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die
EU, SWP Diskussionspapier, März 2007.
28 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), pp. 801–820.
29 Presidency Conclusions Santa Maria de Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000, <http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm> (15/01/2006).
30 Rachel Bronson, When Soldiers Become Cops, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002, pp. 122–132; Graham
Day, Christopher Freeman, Police-keeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Post-war Iraq,
in: International Affairs, No. 2/2003, pp. 299–313, p. 313.
31 Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Brussels, December 2004 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st15/st1533 0-
re03.en04.pdf> (01/10/2006).
32 Christopher Reynolds, All Together Now? The Governance of Military Capability Reform in the ESDP (College of
Europe Working Paper Series, No. 1), Bruges, October 2006.
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the other. Needless to say that the late development of a strategic document (ESS
in 2003) did certainly not help to improve civilian and military capacities: without
a raison d’être and a goal, it is difficult to raise awareness, credibility and commitment
from the member states. Finally, also the development of military capacities
seems partly crisis driven, with the call for military capacities arising during
the Kosovo War. This emphasizes once again the reactive nature of EU strategic
development.
Implementation
Actorness requires the implementation of the agreed policies with the help of established
means. Since the first EU mission Concordia, launched in March 2003
in Macedonia, the increasing number of missions witnesses the international
presence of the EU, even if it does not always equal international recognition
of actorness as such. The EU has successfully carried out civilian and military
missions, the latter as well with recourse to NATO assets as agreed upon in the
“Berlin Plus” agreement (such as Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina), as on an
EU-only basis (such as Artemis in DR Congo in 2003). Current EU missions
reflect the implementation of the EU’s foreign policy priorities as outlined in the
ESS: such as the support mission to the police force in the Palestinian territories
(EUPOL COPPS) or the mission to train Iraqi judges, prosecutors and security
forces (EUJUST LEX). The mission Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taken
over by the EU from NATO in 2004, reflects again the EU’s commitment to link
the military and civil dimensions of its conflict management capabilities.
EU missions have been of growing significance in that more and increasingly
various tasks have been accomplished. Eighteen missions have been carried out
or are currently in place, covering the whole range of civilian, police and military
operations.33 Moreover, they are significant in that a “greater sense of responsibility
for the EU as a credible strategic actor” has emerged, thus also boosting
the self-confidence of the EU.34 Each mission represented an opportunity to
“improve policy-making capacity, to achieve greater consistency and coherence
in integrating the EU’s different policy instruments, and to ensure a consensus
among all member states“.35
However, the successful implementation of EU actions is conditioned by the
intergovernmental decision-making structure as much as by diverging expectations
of the member states. The hesitancy among the member states about sup-
33 EU operation as end of May 2006: <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg>
(01/10/2006).
34 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 807.
35 ibid.
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porting the UN mission in DR Congo for the elections in summer 2006 shows
that the sole existence of a strategy and of military and civilian capabilities does
not automatically lead to action.36 Preceding strategic deliberations such as in the
Africa strategy or the ESS might have made it easier to consider EU involvement
in Africa. But it also means that the African states and the UN could take the EU
by its word and demand greater engagement. The Congo mission exemplifies that
the sole existence of institutions, strategies and resources does not automatically
increase the sense of responsibility of the member states, nor does it accelerate
or improve the decision-making at the EU level and the interaction of the EU
with national levels.37
This analysis leads to an ambiguous conclusion. On the one hand, the EU seems
to be a rapidly developing and constantly improving strategic actor. It disposes of
strategic guidelines in form of the ESS and other regional and sectoral strategies.
It is equipped with the institutional settings to decide, implement and monitor
policies. It possesses an increasing set of military, police and civilian capacities.
Finally, the EU is present as actor in some regions, such as in the Balkans.
However, even if the EU does play a significant role in some areas, its influence
on critical issues of international politics, such as in the Middle East, remains limited.
As Edwards and Cornish put it, the EU’s commitment “is comprehensible
in declaratory terms, but not in implementation.”38 Its performance as well as its
perception as strategic actor are in fact rather limited. A fully fledged actor entails
not only the existence of institutional and material capacities and capabilities but
precisely their rapid, credible and efficient applicability and application. This is
rarely the case for the EU, as reflected by the ongoing shortfalls in military and
civilian HGs or painfully long decision-making processes, such as regarding the
EUFOR Congo.
As identified above, one major obstacle to cooperation and effective action seems
to be the persistent lack of political will of the member states. It is illustrated
by their persevering reluctance to move beyond intergovernmental co-operation
as well as by their inability to reconcile EU capabilities with rhetoric of strategic
actorness. As Gross and Giegerich point out, the main dilemma for the EU
lies in the conflicting demands for efficiency (as actor) and legitimacy (required
for actions).39 For them, the core problem is a dual inefficiency at the EU level:
36 Major, Riecke, Europe’s little blue book (fn. 19).
37 ibid.
38 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.
39 Bastian Giegerich, Eva Gross, Squaring the Circle? Leadership and Legitimacy in European Security and Defence
Cooperation, in: International Politics, No. 43 /2006, pp. 500–509.
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New Faces Conference 2006
ineffective national solutions on the one hand and non-existing supranational
solutions at the other hand. The existing intergovernmental solution in form of
CFSP/ESDP has so far proved unsatisfactory since it has avoided tackling the
question of efficiency and legitimacy. If the consensus and unanimity required in
CFSP/ESDP provided legitimacy, the costs of such are reduced efficiency.40 This
raises the thorny question whether – in order to improve efficiency—the input
into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function of a country’s contribution,
be it in terms of money or troops.41
Where Do We Go From Here? Policy Recommendations to Further European Strategic
Actorness42
How can the EU improve its strategic actorness? In a first step, the EU needs
to address the “old” question of what international role it wants to play in what
particular scenarios. The EU should not limit itself to a unique role, but rather
define how it will react under which circumstances. This requires a further definition
of “European interests,” as called for in the ESS. Only then can a sense of
European togetherness emerge. The above outlined weaknesses are originated at
both national and EU levels. Both are addressed in the following recommendations:
EU needs to further develop existing strategy
The EU’s regional and sectoral strategies require further refinement. The painful
debate about whether and how the EU should engage in the DR Congo proved
that regional strategies are not sufficiently developed. Closely linked: the EU
needs to discuss its priorities and criteria for regional stability missions.
Go ahead even without the Constitutional Treaty (CT)
The CT addressed a major weakness of EU actorness, that is, the intergovernmental
decision-making structures based on unanimity. The member states
should strive for strengthening the EU’s and Solana’s role independent from the
future of the CT. In order to enhance Solana’s leadership role, he could receive
more influence on the CFSP agenda, in defining policy and he could be given
more responsibility for dialog with partners. More generally the soft governance
rules in CFSP/ESDP need reform. So far, the required consensus and unanimity
provide legitimacy, but at the cost of reduced effectiveness. How to conciliate
40 ibid.
41 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 39); Steven Everts, Berlin-Paris-London, in: Alfred Pijpers (ed.), On Cores
and Coalitions in the European Union: The Position of Some Smaller Member States (Clingendael Institute), The
Hague 2000, pp. 15-32.
42 This section strongly draws upon Major and Riecke 2006 (fn. 19) and further develops their argument. This note shall
serve as reference for the whole section.
New Faces Conference 2006 30
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
leadership and legitimacy? It is worth discussing, as raised by Evert and Gross &
Giegerich, whether the input into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function
of a country’s contribution, be it material or financial.43
Create capabilities
The EU must display convincingly to its partners and the outside world that it
wants to act and has the capabilities and capacities to do so. The implementation
of the military HG 2010 and the civilian HG 2008 is one step. The EDA assists
in co-ordinating member states’ procurement and joint projects. However, it has
no leverage to urge reluctant governments to live up to their promises. Eventually,
the ability to fulfil the EU’s capability needs lies in the hands of the member
states.
Enhance co-operation
Strategic debate is not worth much if it does not lead to co-ordination of EU
instruments and between the member states. Cross pillar co-ordination is needed,
for example on security, trade and development, as well as on migration and law
enforcement. All European actors—governments, representatives of council,
commission and parliament—must be involved in the strategic development. The
Civil-Military-Cell, composed of personnel from different EU agencies as well as
the member states, is a good example for such a co-ordination.
Increase member states commitment
The member states are key to the development of a European strategic actorness.
Solana cannot run CFSP/ESDP alone; he needs the commitment of the member
states to turn indifference into attention and action. Just as the UK and France
have put Africa on the agenda, other states can shape strategies of regional or
sectoral engagement. With regard to the national level, governments need to update
their security concepts and policies and put them into perspective with EU
documents. The Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, issued by the German
Federal Foreign Office in 2004, refers to the ESS. Furthermore, national governments
need to identify their defense needs on the basis of the EU threat assessment,
define the levels of ambitions for participation in EU missions, and specify
their contributions.44
Conclusion
Several criteria corroborate the initial hypothesis that the EU has considerably
advanced in developing its strategic actorness. The EU disposes of a strategy,
43 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 39).
44 Wim van Eekelen: From words to deeds. The continuing debate on European Security (Centre for European Policy
Studies, Brussels, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), Brussels/Geneva 2006, p. 292.
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New Faces Conference 2006
institutions and decision making capacities, of increasing civilian, police and
military capabilities, and is worldwide involved in civilian, police and military missions.
On the other hand, its slow decision-making process, the ongoing shortfalls
in the material dimension and the lack of presence in important issues of
international politics, eventually reveal the lack of international recognition and
ultimately point to the limits of European strategic actorness.
It would, however, be too easy to dismiss the EU’s strategic actorness so quickly.
It is worth reminding that the EU’s strategic development only seriously took off
with the inception of ESDP (1999), less then seven years ago, with the first missions
being carried out only in 2003. As a very young actor, the EU has not only
to develop and get used to its tools, but it also has to compete with long established
actors, be it the nation states or international organizations such as NATO.
The strategic development of the EU cannot be assessed without taking into
account its partners, and in particular, the transatlantic ties. In fact, one reason
why the EU actorness is so quickly dismissed is that the criteria used to assess its
accomplishments might not be adapted to evaluate the EU and might therefore
generate unreasonable expectations. For example, the EU does not strive to become
a defense organization (at least not yet). Consequently, a comparison with
NATO is potentially little meaningful if not misleading. The question should
rather be: what can the EU reasonably be expected to be?
As it stands now, the EU will only be a supplementary foreign policy tool for the
member states, it will not replace national policies and actions. Since the member
states remain reluctant to confer greater power to the EU in the sensitive realm
of security and defense, the decision-making at the EU level is confined to unanimity
with its inherent limits. If the main obstacle is thus a lack of political will,
one possibility to develop the EU into a more relevant strategic actor would be to
impact upon the very logic of the nation states’ strategic interests.
Thus, how to raise the interest of the member states to act through the EU
framework or to further confer responsibilities to the EU level? The challenges
that the member states face today are not longer solely national and territorial,
and it is increasingly difficult to tackle them on a solely national basis. So the interest
of the nation states in acting through the EU framework with access to the
extensive EU tool box might increase as it offers additional means and opportunities.
45 For example, military interventions have become increasingly risky, just as it
is ever more difficult to gain domestic support for them. In fact, it is the ongoing
45 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn.7).
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Security Cooperation
development of the international security environment itself that might make acting
trough the EU framework increasingly attractive for the EU member states.
Eventually, the success of the EU in strategic terms depends upon the commitment
of the member states. That they were able to agree on a common strategic
paper (i. e. the ESS) demonstrates that the EU started to think in global terms; and
that member states are starting to engage with challenges beyond their reach, their
available means and strategic horizon. The adoption of the ESS affirms the EU’s
ambition to make a proper mark on the course of global events in what Mark
Leonard calls the emerging “New European Century.” According to him, the 21st
century will be a European one, not because “Europe will run the world as an
empire, but because the European way of doing things will become the world’s.”46
However, this vision will only materialise if the EU convincingly turns ambitions
into actions and lets deeds follow words. Strategy is the implementation of objectives,
based on an outline and enabled by the appropriate means. Consequently,
implementation is also the ultimate test of a strategy. To keep the EU’s strategic
(r)evolution alive, the EU should above all assure the implementation of its current
level of ambition. This may include disappointments, sometimes even failure,
which may raise political concerns about the EU’s capacity as appropriate agent.
But it may also allow for learning, evidence based adoption of strategies, and a
growing record of serious achievements, recognized by internal critics as well as
by the international community. Any other approach is a dead end on the way
towards strategic actorness.
46 Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century, London 2005, p. 143 .
Deepening
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A New Strategic Partnership?
Deepening UN-NATO Relations
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
“As we enter a new century of challenges and inevitable crises, it is critically important for
us to draw on each other’s strengths in pursuit of peace and security.”
(Kofi Annan, 1999)
The threats and challenges posed by today’s security environment are so complex
that no single state or international organization can tackle them all by itself. Accordingly,
the question of how to build new ties between key international institutions
has emerged as a major issue in the current international security debate. As
two of the world’s most important security providers, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) could benefit greatly from a
more structured relationship.
Historical and Strategic Background
During the Cold War period, UN and NATO almost did not co-operate at
all—their functions and responsibilities were significantly different. What is more,
their perceptions of each other were largely negative. NATO, as one of two rival
military alliances in Europe, was regarded in UN circles as being part of the
problem of high arms expenditures and confrontational policies rather than being
a guarantor for peace and security. The UN, on the other hand, was perceived
by some NATO members as politically ineffective due to the stalemate in the
UN Security Council (UNSC), and militarily irrelevant to the collective defence
arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic Area.
The dramatic events in the early 1990s changed all that. They brought about a
very different security environment which forced international organizations involved
in peace-building to rethink their strategies. Traditional East-West tensions
were replaced by security challenges that were much more multifaceted in nature.
They included terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as well as trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms. Conflicts between
states decreased, but violent internal conflicts multiplied. Some of these threats
Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999, <http://152.152.96.1/
docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.
Derek G. Boothby, Background Paper, in: IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship: Co-operation between the UN
and NATO: Quo Vadis?, New York, 11 June 1999. Martin A. Smith, At Arm’s Length: NATO and the United Nations
in the Cold War Era, in: International Peacekeeping, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 56–73, p. 56.
Benedikta
von Seherr-Thoss
New Faces Conference 2006 34
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
were not new, but they had gained an unprecedented global dimension which
seriously affected national security and international stability.
The new strategic environment also demands more complex forms of peacekeeping.
Going beyond security in the narrow military sense, peacekeeping today
encompasses political reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
(DDR), governance, economic regeneration and development. The aim is to
create reliable domestic institutions and stable conditions which prevent countries
from relapsing into conflict. This also means that engagement has to be longterm.
In a speech at NATO headquarters in January 1999 UN Secretary General
(SG) Kofi Annan stressed this point, saying: “No one […] can expect our future
tasks to be easy in execution or short in duration.”
As the diversity of the task has grown, so too has its quantity. Over the past
decade, the demand for the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations has
multiplied and the number of peacekeeping operations has increased more than
four-fold. Whilst only 13 operations were established in the first 40 years of the
UN’s history, 47 missions have been conducted since. There are currently more
than 90,000 personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations.
For NATO, the post-Cold War changes were equally profound. As the major
challenges for transatlantic security would increasingly emerge in regions beyond
Europe, NATO had to be enabled to address these challenges wherever they
originated. As a result, NATO gradually shed its traditional “eurocentric” focus,
and shifted towards the conduct of out-of-area operations ranging from combat
to peacekeeping operations, and from training to humanitarian relief. Accordingly,
NATO also transformed its military forces. For example, it developed rapid
reaction forces that could be deployed over long distances and sustained over
extended periods of time. The UN, on the other hand, had to realize that it was
no longer able to address crises on its own—it needed to find suitable partners.
This was the starting point for co-operation with NATO.
Co-operation to Date
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Practical co-operation between the UN and NATO began in 1992, when the Alliance
decided to support the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, thus ac-
Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Peace-Keeping Operations: Requirements and Effectiveness; NATO’s Role (NATO Academic
Forum Report), June 2001, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/lemos-maniati.pdf>.
Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999, <http://152.152.96.1/
docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.
United Nations Peacekeeping. Meeting New Challenges, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.
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UN-NATO Relations
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New Faces Conference 2006
tively entering the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. This decision
constituted a revolutionary break with previous NATO policies, as the Balkans
produced many more “firsts” for the Alliance: the first out-of-area deployment,
the first peacekeeping operation and the first significant co-operation with other
international organizations. Initially, NATO ships monitored operations in the
Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former
Yugoslavia.
This readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the
authority of the UNSC was officially expressed by NATO Foreign Ministers in
December 1992. Alliance members indicated that they were ready to respond
positively to further UN enquiries for NATO assistance. Subsequently, co-operation
was extended including, inter alia, maritime and air operations, close air support
for the UN Protection Force and air strikes to protect UN “Safe Areas.”
In its 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance repeated its offer “to support, on a
case-by-case basis, and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and
other operations under the authority of the UNSC […], including by making
available Alliance resources and expertise.” Although NATO does not want to
serve as toolbox to the world organization, it is prepared to act within the parameters
of the sub-contracting model. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer reiterated this offer in his address to the UNSC in November 2004.
Until 2004, the Alliance helped maintaining a secure environment and facilitating
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reconstruction. During this time NATO forces worked
closely on the ground with other international organizations, including those of
the UN, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the UN International Police Task Force.
Today, NATO continues to assist Bosnia in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. For example,
it has maintained a military headquarters in the country to help it with the
reform of its defence structures and its eventual accession to NATO’s Partnership
for Peace programme. The Alliance also remains in close contact with UN
representatives, with whom it discusses a wide range of issues such as civil-military
co-operation, detention and DDR.
1999 NATO Strategic Concept, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm>, para. 31.
Dick Leurdijk, NATO and the UN. The Dynamics of an Evolving Relationship, in: RUSI Journal, No. 3, June 2004,
pp. 24–28, p. 27.
New Faces Conference 2006 36
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
Kosovo
The Kosovo crisis and the Alliance’s 78-day air campaign constitute a significant
chapter in UN-NATO relations. For one year, the international community had
watched internal fighting, which culminated in massive human rights abuses and
crimes against humanity. After all diplomatic means had been exhausted, NATO
decided to launch an air campaign to force the Serbian authorities to abort their
ethnic cleansing. The UN had been unable to act or even to formulate a UNSC
Resolution, due to a stalemate caused by Russia. Hence, NATO was forced to apply
force without UN mandate. This put it into a serious political, moral and legal
dilemma and caused one of the most controversial debates in NATO’s history.
Since the vital national interests or physical security of NATO’s member states
were not directly threatened by the ethnic violence in Kosovo, the Alliance was
not able to justify the use of force as an act of self-defence. Instead, it intervened
explicitly on humanitarian grounds, knowing that this was the only way to
halt a humanitarian catastrophe. Being an alliance of values, NATO was ready to
defend peace and security not only for its own members but within the whole of
Europe. The morality of the intervention was thus stronger than the problem of
not being mandated by the UN.
The UN’s reaction to NATO’s autonomous action was twofold: SG Kofi Annan
stressed that the UNSC was the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force.
With equal emphasis, however, he stated that there were “times when the use of
force may be legitimate for the pursuit of peace.” When international action was
urgently needed in Kosovo, the SC failed to unify these two elements due to the
above-mentioned stalemate. As NATO’s intervention was designed to restore
peace and security and defend human rights, the Allies considered it acceptable.
Generally, however, the UN demands that the fact that it is the only power that
can authorize the use of force be recognized by all its members. All other paths,
it fears, might lead to anarchy.10 This is why the Alliance’s ongoing demand to
decide autonomously on the use of force is frequently criticized within UN
circles. Even though the Alliance accepts the UNSC’s primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, it is not willing to regard this
as an exclusive right.11 Instead, it retains the right to decide autonomously on the
Legally, NATO is a collective defence system as defined under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This article allows the
use of force without UN mandate, as part of self-defence (United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org>).
UN SG Kofi Annan’s speech in The Hague, 18 May 1999 (UN Press Release SG/SM/6997).
10 Ibid.
11 Leurdijk, UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link (Netherlands Institute of International Organizations,
Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, No. 4), October 2005, pp. 6 and 33 .
Deepening
UN-NATO Relations
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New Faces Conference 2006
use of force, without a formal authorization by the SC. This is not justified with
NATO’s character as a collective defence organization, but rather with its selfperception
as a contributor to collective security and as a community of values.
Following NATO’s air campaign in April 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution
1244 which established NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), through which it continued
its engagement in the region. NATO’s future involvement will depend on the
outcome of the Kosovo status talks and on the security situation following the
settlement. What is already clear, though, is that NATO’s military and political
presence will be maintained for some time to contain any possible outbreaks of
violence.
Afghanistan
In August 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF—the International Security
Assistance Force. This is the first NATO-led peace-support operation, far away
from its own territory and far outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF is an Article
VII operation and could be taken as an example of NATO serving as sub-contractor
to the UN. Each step of NATO’s expansion from Kabul into the regions,
a presence that now covers the whole of Afghanistan, required a UNSC mandate.
So did the establishment of NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).
From the beginning, a close partnership existed between UNAMA (UN Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan) and NATO-led ISAF. Every three months,
NATO’s chief commander sends a report to the UN SG informing him about
the latest developments in the country. NATO also has a Senior Civilian Representative
who is located in Kabul. He carries forward the Alliances political-military
objectives, liaising with the Afghan government, civil society and of course
representatives of UNAMA. As in the Balkans, UN and NATO representatives
discuss a wide range of topics. These include drugs, terrorism, civil-military cooperation,
disarmament and reintegration as well as elections and the build-up of
democratic structures.
Iraq
In Iraq, under the terms of the UNSC Resolution 1546 and at the specific request
of the Interim Iraqi Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and
equipping the Iraqi security forces. NATO and the UN, which had both suffered
a severe internal crisis as a result of the Iraq controversy, each decided to engage
in Iraq in this way. It allowed them to help create peaceful and stable conditions
in the country without engaging in the actual conflict.
New Faces Conference 2006 38
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
Darfur
NATO also provides logistical assistance to the African Union’s (AU) UN-endorsed
peacekeeping operation in Sudan. In response to the deteriorating situation
in Sudan’s Darfur region, the AU asked NATO in April 2005 for logistical
support for its mission (AMIS). This included the co-ordination of strategic
airlift support for the deployment of AMIS units as well as staff capacity building.
On several occasions, NATO expressed its readiness to support a possible
future UN mission in Darfur.
Pakistan
In October 2005, in response to a request from Pakistan and UNHCR, NATO
launched an operation to assist the relief effort following a devastating earthquake.
NATO airlifted supplies donated by NATO member and partner countries
as well as by UNHCR to the troubled region. In addition, it deployed engineers
and medical personnel from the NATO Response Force (NRF). To address
this humanitarian crisis as effectively and quickly as possible, NATO’s Disaster
Response Co-ordination Centre co-ordinated closely with relevant UN agencies.
Looking at these operations, it can be said that UN-NATO co-operation in the
field has largely been successful. The question that has to be answered now is
what the organizations will make of their existing relations and whether they
want to expand and structure them.
Deepening Co-operation
Dealing with conflicts nowadays involves a wide range of issues, which in turn
requires a wide range of actors: military, civilian, humanitarian and development
organizations. To work effectively, these institutions have to have a clear understanding
of each other’s cultures, policies and strengths. Every international
organization has something different to offer and its particular skills must be
used to best effect. Pragmatism and open-mindedness are essential conditions for
developing a culture of co-operation and greater understanding of each other’s
capabilities.
NATO, for example, is still widely perceived as a purely military organization. Yet
it has many other useful tools at its disposal, such as capacity building, training
and assistance, and dealing with defence aspects of security sector reform. Moreover,
the Alliance is also a forum for consultation, not only amongst its 26 member
states, but also within an extensive and growing network of partner nations.
These tools could be exploited in conjunction with those of other international
Deepening
UN-NATO Relations
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New Faces Conference 2006
bodies and organizations to deliver a coherent and comprehensive approach to
today’s security challenges.
Of course, NATO also has substantial military assets that are in short supply
elsewhere. These include capabilities for both combat and post-conflict reconstruction.
The availability of NATO airlift, communications, logistics arrangements,
technical skills and high readiness units such as the NRF could be a
valuable asset for the UN. In the Balkans, for example, NATO has been a crucial
actor in supporting restructuring, training and equipping of national armed
forces. Lack of this particular expertise is severely hampering the International
Community in post-conflict peace operations today. In many troubled countries—
DRC, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan—the construction and implementation of an
effective and democratic security sector presents one of the main obstacles to
successful stabilization and long-term stability. This area has particular potential
in deeper UN-NATO co-operation in peacekeeping.
UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno underlined
the significance of rapidly deployable military assets for peacekeeping during his
visit to NATO HQ in January 2006. He argued that given the nature of spoilers
in post-conflict contexts and the signal a credible force can provide, the speed
and effectiveness of such assets was often far more crucial than the actual size of
the deployment.
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss
New Faces Conference 2006 40
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
With the steep rise in demand for UN peace operations, the UN soon realized
that doing the job alone was impossible given the organization’s lack of resources.
Already in 1992, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that regional actors could
ease the burden of the UN. To enable and facilitate co-operation, he demanded
a structured approach and conceptual frameworks.12 As a first step, he set up a
“High Level Panel” consisting of the UN, regional and other international organizations.
It meets on an annual basis to discuss co-operation and better co-ordination.
Boutros-Ghali’s successor Kofi Annan shared this view.13 At the UN World Summit
in 2005, he underlined the importance of developing predictable partnerships
and formalized arrangements between the UN and international organizations.14
Annan laid particular emphasis on NATO.
In March 2004, during a visit of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to New
York, he urged expanded NATO engagement in Afghanistan and stronger support
for UN efforts in Africa. He suggested that the Alliance might be employed
in a “peace-enforcement” role, as a bridging force before the deployment of a
UN operation.
The issue of NATO supporting new UN peacekeeping operations was also
discussed during the round table meeting in New York a few weeks later. UN
officials underlined that whilst there was a need for robust military capabilities to
deter challenges, there were substantial operational weaknesses which could jeopardize
any UN mission, such as lack of interoperability among the troops, lack of
common training, and lack of intelligence. With a view to these shortfalls, they
expressed interest in NATO’s capabilities.
This demonstrates that the UN has clearly recognized the advantages that NATO
could bring in the context of peace operations and conflict management. Making
use of Alliance assets, however, requires a more structured relationship which
goes beyond ad hoc operational engagement. At the moment, the good co-operation
in the field contrasts with a lack of co-operation at the institutional level. In
2003, a first staff meeting took place at headquarters level and a few more have
followed since. However, there is no structured exchange between the organizations.
12 UN SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A747/277-S/24111, New York, June 1992.
13 Report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities,
28 July 2006 (A/61/204-S/2006/590*).
14 Para 93 and 170 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
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New Faces Conference 2006
To change this, a UN-NATO declaration is currently being developed. It comes
as an answer to Annan’s frequent call for co-operation and, at the same time,
demonstrates NATO’s readiness to support UN peace efforts.15 This support is
clearly in the interest of all NATO Allies. By responding to security threats where
they occur, NATO can safeguard peace and security of its own members. Many
weak and failing states have disintegrated into safe-havens for terrorists. Hence,
operations designed to prevent state failure and frustrate terrorist networks—
even on other continents—is in NATO’s strategic interest.
The UN-NATO declaration is supposed to add an institutional element to, and
serve as a political framework for, the already good co-operation in theatre. The
aim is to make relations more predictable and provide a platform for intensified
dialogue. This would lead to a greater understanding of each organization’s
modus operandi on issues of common interest. Ideally, it would result in broader
and more effective co-operation without duplication.
Practically, this could involve regular staff-level meetings and frequent exchanges
on issues in which both organizations are active and interested. The Secretary
Generals could meet and NATO could brief the UNSC. Moreover, a NATO
civilian representative could be posted at the UN Department for Political Affairs.
He/she would ensure regular political exchange and ideally improve the speed
and effectiveness to identify and react to conflict.
Conclusion
Recently, the idea of “civil-military co-operation” has begun to feature prominently
on the agendas of both NATO and the UN. Behind this is the conviction
that greater harmonization and co-ordination between international organizations,
and mutual support of civil and military efforts, are vital factors to ensure the
success of a peace mission. Only this way can the activities of the international
community be optimized. Afghanistan serves as a perfect example. Whilst military
operations are going well, synchronization with stabilization and reconstruction
efforts remain imperative for the overall success of the mission. This means
that crises have to be tackled in a holistic fashion, with specific organizations
addressing the issues that lie in their areas of expertise.
15 For example, see: Keynote address by NATO Secretary General Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 24 May 2005, <http://
www.NATO.int/docu/speech/2005/s050524a.htm>, in which he stressed that NATO’s relations with the UN had
to go beyond ad hoc co-operation on the ground. He underlined that structured relationships at the institutional level
were needed as well as strategic co-ordination, not just tactical co-operation.
New Faces Conference 2006 42
Panel I: Regional
Security Cooperation
The rationale of co-operation between the UN and NATO lies in their adaptation
to the new security environment. Both organizations have understood that
today’s challenges can only be addressed and countered together. However, even
though a partnership seems logical and necessary against this background, the situation
is not quite that simple. Sensitivities and misperceptions still exist between
the UN and NATO. For example, some nations within the UN perceive NATO
as a toolbox for US interests and fear that it might seek to be a world policeman,
even though NATO vehemently denies having that ambition. On the other hand,
at NATO, voices can be heard that are critical or doubtful towards the UN. This
considerably slows down the process of establishing a structured relationship.
The key for the future is thus to remain flexible and pragmatic. Enhanced UNNATO
co-operation, particularly at the institutional level, would provide a good
basis for meeting the challenges of the 21st century more effectively.
John Byrom, Marcel Gerber and Stuart Reigeluth
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Oil and Gas Hub
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New Faces Conference 2006
The Venezuelan Oil and Gas Hub: A Regional and Global
Perspective of Energy Supply and Security Policy
Gerardo J. Briceño P.
In a new world order characterized by anxiety over energy supply, rising energy
prices promote changes in world politics. In the light of initiatives on global energy
security that have been adopted under Russia’s presidency of the G8, stable
oil prices and energy cooperation are at the top of the foreign agenda. Venezuela
is positioning itself as an energy hub for the entire sub-continent, creating interdependencies
with many countries in the region and beyond.
Among Venezuela’s projects for regional integration are pipelines designed to link
it with Brazil and Argentina. A pipeline going from Colombia across the Pacific
Ocean, which would facilitate Asian access to Venezuelan petroleum, is also being
considered. With these plans, Venezuela responds to the current Iranian crisis,
triggered by Iran’s refusal to end its program of uranium enrichment. In addition,
and besides campaigning for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council,
the Venezuelan government has recently signed several arms and energy deals,
though not with its traditional partner in both areas, the US. Instead, Moscow
seems to have guaranteed the emerging Caracas–Beijing strategic partnership by
supplying aircraft, weapons, and technology.
World demand for energy, especially for limited oil and natural gas supplies, is
increasing as large industrializing nations such as China, India and Brazil expand
their economies. Therefore, future oil producers will be able to choose their
buyers. This situation presents a new outlook for global oil governance. Current
changes in world politics caused by rising energy prices have influenced this new
reality, which derives from both a regional net of energy supply within Latin
America and global partnerships with Asia in security matters. Propelled by vast
amounts of energy resources, the Venezuelan government has adopted a policy
of using energy as a political commodity in its foreign relations, counterbalancing
US energy market expectations. This paper focuses on interdependencies resulting
from energy demand, addressing the latest developments of the Venezuelan
oil and gas policy and its impact on the new architecture of global energy security.
After two weeks of voting and 47 ballots, it was an outsider, Panama, who emerged as the winner of the seat of the
UN Security Council. Panama became the compromise candidate after a stand-off between Venezuela and its rival,
Guatemala. Finally, both candidates withdrew in favour of Panama. See: Simón Romero. ‘Latin Fight for U.N. Security
Council Seat Ends,’ The New York Times, November 2, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/02/world/
americas/02nations.html?ex=1320123600&en=e7dd01652b514671&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
Gerardo J. Briceño P.
New Faces Conference 2006 44
Panel II:
Energy Security
1. Global Energy Security
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, and the emergence of the US as the unchallenged
leader in world affairs have dramatically altered the dynamics of regional
and global security. What is more, scenarios of possible conflict are today linked
to potential oil and gas suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, Nigeria,
Angola, Algeria, Sudan, northern Siberia, the southern Chinese Sea, Indonesia,
and Venezuela. In light of initiatives on global energy security that have been
adopted under Russia’s presidency of the G8, stable oil prices and energy cooperation
have reached the top of the foreign agenda. At the G8 summit in Saint
Petersburg in July 2006, global energy security principles were stated. Leaders of
the G8 must commit to:
– open, transparent, efficient and competitive markets for energy production,
supply, use, transmission and transit services as a key to global energy security;
– enhanced dialogue on relevant stakeholders’ perspectives on growing interdependence,
security of supply and demand issues;
– diversification of energy supply and demand, energy sources, geographical
and sectorial markets, transportation routes and means of transport;
– safeguarding critical energy infrastructure; and
– addressing the energy challenges for the poorest populations in developing
countries.
Venezuela is the world’s fifth-largest oil exporter, and its oil reserves are among
the top ten in the world. Increases in world oil prices over the last few years have
allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to push the government’s social
program spending, expand its commercial ties to other countries, and boost his
own international profile. The New York Times reports that the huge amount of
unconventional extra-heavy crude oil reserves in the Orinoco Belt region (located
southeast of Caracas), estimated around 235 billion barrels, if added to those 78
billion barrels of conventional crude oil, could allow Venezuela to rival the oil
Genaro Arriagada, Petróleo y gas en América Latina – Un análisis político y de relaciones internacionales a partir de
la política venezolana (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Especial Energía – DT N°
20/2006), Madrid 2006, p. 1.
For the official web site of the G8 presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006 and its statement concerning global
energy security, see: <http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html>.
Cesar J. Alvarez, Venezuela’s Oil-Based Economy (Council of Foreign Relations), New York, November 27, 2006,
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/>.
The Venezuelan
Oil and Gas Hub
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New Faces Conference 2006
production of Saudi Arabia, provided this extra-heavy oil could be turned into a
more marketable product.
Regional Oil and Gas Cooperation in Latin America
Latin American oil integration remains a geopolitical commodity, aimed at establishing
mechanisms of cooperation and integration by using the energy resources
of the regions of the Caribbean, Central and South America as the basis for the
socioeconomic improvement of the sub-continent. The Venezuelan government
looks to build a unified South America that could function as an independent
bloc and counterbalance expectations of the US energy market. Propelled by its
energy wealth and the steady rise in oil prices, it has become much more powerful
and aggressive in expanding its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In order to achieve its aims, the Venezuelan President has officially taken
direct control of growing international reserves and used them to build influence
abroad.
Nevertheless, this boom has not yet succeeded in uniting the region. Since its admission
into MERCOSUR in July 2006, Venezuela’s participation has depended
on the changing price of oil. Venezuela, South America’s third-largest market, is
positioning itself as an energy hub, creating interdependencies with many of the
region’s countries. Increased oil revenues have allowed the government to provide
domestic social programs with generous funding, thereby bolstering its image in
the country as well as the region.
Regional Net in Big Format: PetroAmérica
Within Latin America, the Venezuelan oil company Petróleos de Venezuela,
S. A. (PDVSA) has made generous oil deals. According to official sources,
PetroAmérica is viewed as an organization capable of ensuring the coordination
and harmonization of energy policies, including oil, oil-derivatives, gas and
electricity as well as the efficient use of these resources, technological cooperation,
training, development of energy infrastructure, and the employment of
alternative sources of energy. PetroAmérica’s initiative of energy integration is
characterized by:
Juan Forero, For Venezuela—A Treasure in Oil Sludge. As Prices Soar, the Orinoco Belt Becomes an Economic
Battleground, in: The New York Times, January 6th, 2006, C Section, p. 1.
For detailed information see the Energy Integration Portal (Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A.), <http://www.pdvsa.pdv.
com>.
New Faces Conference 2006 46
Panel II:
Energy Security
– redefining existing relations among South American countries on the basis
of their resources and potentials;
– taking advantage of economic, social, and cultural accomplishments to reduce
differences in the region;
– reducing the negative effects of energy costs on the countries in the region,
caused by speculative and geopolitical factors;
– strengthening other regional initiatives like MERCOSUR, CAN, ALBA, etc.
Areas of Cooperation
PetroAmérica and its homologous sub-regional agreements have made progress
in several fields: direct negotiations among states, declarations and development
of joint initiatives by regions, subscription of integral agreements of cooperation,
identification of areas of cooperation, bilateral agreements between companies
and institutes of the signatory states, and the establishment of societies under
agreements of specific cooperation on several subjects. Three sub-regional initiatives
of energy integration make up PetroAmérica: PetroSur, PetroCaribe, and
PetroAndina.
1) PetroSur
Signatory countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela.
As the greatest provider for MERCOSUR, Venezuela will limit its participation
mostly to oil investments. This agreement calls for the construction of a gas
pipeline that would carry natural gas southwards from the Caribbean Sea across
the Amazon jungle to Brazil and Argentina.
2) PetroCaribe
Signatory countries (not exclusive): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Venezuela.
The PetroCaribe agreement improves the financial conditions of latter agreements
by proposing a scale of financial facilities related to the price of crude oil.
Besides that, it foresees an expansion of the payment period to 25 years, limiting
interest rates to 1% if oil prices exceed $40 per barrel.
3) PetroAndina
Signatory countries: proposed to the countries from the Andean community of
nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela).
This agreement calls for pipelines designed to link Venezuela and Colombia, as
well as another oil pipeline across Colombia to the Pacific Ocean, intended to
facilitate Asian access to Venezuela’s petroleum.
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Asia: A Global Partnership of Energy Supply and Technology Transfer
The emergence of China as the world’s largest consumer of raw materials looms
as a new major issue in global geopolitics. This development has occurred so
quickly that until now governments did not have time to ponder its implications.
At the same time, significant alliances are currently in the making. Venezuela is
building a very promising strategic alliance with China. This global integration
provides an open door to Asia, where Russia also plays a decisive role. Within
this partnership, both countries need each other. China, currently the world’s
second largest oil consumer, craves oil. To maintain its prodigious growth, China
needs to increase its energy supply by around 4 million barrels p/d by 2010,
nearly twice of what it currently imports. Energy anxiety has forced China to
diversify its sources of oil supply. Because of new price trends, Asia has emerged
as a major player within the world economy and on the global energy scene.10 As
part of this dynamic process, China could receive some of the oil that Venezuela
currently supplies to the US, as the Venezuelan president stated during his last
David Hale, China’s Growing Appetites, in: The National Interest, summer 2004, p. 137.
Günther Maihold, China and Latin America, in: Gudrun Wacker (ed.), China’s Rise: The Return of Geopolitics? (SWP
Research Paper, RP 1), Berlin, February 2006, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_
id=3170>, pp. 37-45.
Gabe Collins and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, Beijing’s Bolivarian Venture, in: The National Interest, January 9, 2006,
<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11912>.
10 Paul Isbell, Fire-breathing dragons: Asia and the challenge of energy security (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales
y Estratégicos, WP N° 17), Madrid 2006.
Discussions continue well into the coffee breaks
New Faces Conference 2006 48
Panel II:
Energy Security
visit to China in summer 2006. This reorientation of oil flow from Venezuela to
China requires a new infrastructure.
According to Chávez, China will receive a large share of Venezuelan oil exports
not only by decreasing deliveries of Venezuelan oil to the US, but also by increasing
the overall output of oil. The amount of oil supplied to China by Venezuela
will thus increase almost sevenfold, meaning that Venezuela will supply around
20% of China’s actual oil needs, thereby overtaking Angola, which currently produces
18% of all oil China consumes.
China’s increased association with Venezuela also coincides with a new evaluation
of the Iranian crisis after Iran’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program.
This alliance could allow China to withstand a possible loss of Iranian oil, in case
the international community imposes further sanctions on Teheran for continuing
its nuclear program.
Shipping Routes: Panama, Nicaragua and Tankers in Big Scale
Since forming its partnership with Venezuela, even a war in the Persian Gulf
does not threaten Beijing. Venezuelan oil is completely profitable and can, in case
of war, substitute the Iranian oil supply. Nowadays, oil can be delivered from
Venezuela to China only by ship, and the closest shipping channel is through the
Panama Canal, which is too narrow for large tankers. Under current conditions,
Venezuelan oil is shipped to China by sea across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
which takes around 45 days and significantly affects the final price.
Beijing has of late succeeded in solving this problem. The Hong Kong firm
Hutchison Whampoa recently won the bid for the management of the canal’s
ports contract. According to Chinese officials, the owner, Hong Kong businessman
Li Ka-Shing, is loyal to Beijing. As result of the planned expansion,11 the
canal will in the future be navigable by tankers with displacements of more than
300,000 tons. It is expected that after the expansion,12 oil tankers from Venezuela
could reach Chinese shores in 24 days, which is approximately the same amount
of time currently needed for oil deliveries from Angola to China.
11 See Panama approves canal expansion, in: BBC news, July 15, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5182472.
stm>.
12 The referendum took place in October and was finally backed by the Panamanians. Voters have overwhelmingly approved
the expansion project. See Panamanians back canal expansion, in: BBC news, October 23, 2006, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6074106.stm>.
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Oil and Gas Hub
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New Faces Conference 2006
As a rival in Central America, Nicaragua has announced plans to build a waterway
linking the Pacific and Atlantic, which would carry bigger ships than the existing
Panama Canal.13 If built, the Inter-Oceanic Nicaragua Canal will be a real alternative
to the existing conditions in Panama. It would also carry super-ships of up
to 250,000 tons, which are significantly bigger than the vessels that currently pass
through Panama.
Hugo Chávez and Hu Jintao also ratified a deal in May 2006, in which Venezuela
agreed to purchase 18 Chinese oil tankers for $1.3 billion. In 2007, Venezuela
plans to buy 42 tankers, thus tripling the size of its oil fleet and ending its dependence
on ships rented from the US. As a result of this contract, Venezuela will
own one of the largest tanker fleets in the world.
The Role of Moscow: Guarantees for the Caracas-Beijing Tandem
Having created its energy security net, Beijing must now maintain it. Perhaps out
of fear of spoiling its relations with Washington, China has not signed any weapons
contracts with Venezuela. However, Moscow supports the China-Venezuela
geopolitical tandem by supplying the Venezuelan government with Russian weapons,
technology, and know-how. This unexpected aid from Moscow has taken
the form of recent contracts to deliver 100,000 AK-47 Kalashnikovs, 53 military
helicopters, and 24 Sukhoi SU-30MK2 planes, which will form the backbone of
the Venezuelan security forces. In addition, two other contracts were signed: one
for the construction of a factory in Venezuela to produce AK-103 automatic
weapons under license, and another venture for manufacturing 7.62 mm calibre
cartridges. The total cost of these contracts to modernize Venezuela’s military
comes to around $3 billion. In addition, Russia’s energy giant GAZPROM is also
thinking of participating in the construction of a $15 billion gas pipeline linking
Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina by 2011.
Relations between the US and Venezuela: Ideologically Divorced but
Economically Married
Despite negative commentary, such as Chávez’s statement at the 61st UN General
Assembly in September 2006,14 Venezuela is still one of the top four suppliers
of crude oil and fuel to the US. The United States absorbs about two-thirds of
Venezuela’s exports, around two million barrels a day. Even though the develop-
13 See Nicaragua plans rival canal route, in: BBC news, October 4, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
5405884.stm>.
14 For full video and transcript from the UN, see <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/gastatement20.shtml>.
New Faces Conference 2006 50
Panel II:
Energy Security
ment of emerging Asian markets could reduce the ties between Venezuela and
the US, trade relations remain strong between the two countries.
The US currently obtains between 13% and 15% of its oil from Venezuela via
three major US-American enterprises—Chevron Texaco, Exxon, and Conoco
Philips. All of them hold investments in Venezuela, mainly in the Orinoco heavy
oil belt. Nevertheless, Venezuela began selling oil to China in December 2004
and has also invited mainly state-owned companies from Russia, Iran, China and
India to invest in its oil sector.
US-American society depends on oil and natural gas, which in turn makes reliable
energy supply a national security issue. Energy analysis from the US Senate15
addresses the following dangers (among others) concerning their energy supply,
which in turn might apply to the Venezuelan oil industry: an abrupt disruption of
supply, the finite nature of energy resources, and the use of energy as a geopolitical
weapon.
Supply disruption
As one of OPEC’s founding members, Venezuela follows decisions taken by the
cartel. The members coordinate their production quotas and agree to raise oil
prices by keeping supplies low. The Venezuelan oil strike of 2002 dramatically
affected supplies, driving up the price of oil. From December 2nd, 2002 to February
2nd, 2003, PDVSA went on strike to protest against the policies of President
Hugo Chávez. Production fell from around 2.9 m b/d to 1.5 m b/d and
all exports stopped. As a result of the strike, the oil sector virtually shut down.
According to a recent report published by the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO),16 even though Venezuelan oil production has fallen since 2001,
exports of crude oil and petroleum products to the US have remained relatively
stable with the exception of the strike period.
Finite Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas
Emerging and growing economies in both the East and the West continue to
drive up prices and energy requirements in the short term. Since one can only
measure the resources of energy on a national scale, it is not clear how long it
15 For speeches and documents from Senator Dick Lugar (R)—Lugar Energy Initiative—see: <http://lugar.senate.gov/
energy/security/index.html>. For Senator Barack Obama’s (D) speech on February 28, 2006, see: <http://obama.
senate.gov/speech/060228-energy_security/index.php>.
16 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Energy Security, Issues Related to Potential Reductions
in Venezuelan Oil Production, June 2006. To view the full GAO report, including the scope and methodology, see
<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-668>.
The Venezuelan
Oil and Gas Hub
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New Faces Conference 2006
could be before the world faces the prospect that energy supplies may not be
abundant and accessible enough to support continued growth around the globe.
Use of Energy as a Geopolitical Weapon
Economies worldwide rely so heavily on oil and natural gas that energy-rich nations
can intimidate or blackmail other nations by threatening to cut off supplies.
Thus, oil exporters who disagree with the US sometimes threaten with the restriction
or redirection of energy supplies. For example, Venezuela’s oil minister and
president of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, warned that eventual military aggression
from the US against Venezuela would result in a redirection of Venezuelan oil to
other markets, namely China.
Despite pre-existing energy policy in the foreign agenda of consumer countries,
heightened competition between consumers to obtain energy from producer
nations will further increase geopolitical tensions in the future, raising the risk of
military conflicts for control of resources.
Global Oil Governance – Strategies for Energy Security
Energy and security represent part of the nucleus of contemporary international
strategic debate. The last century saw rapid growth in fossil fuel consumption,
and a corresponding expansion in exploration and discovery of new energy
sources and resources. Energy consumption continues to rise in all regions of
the world, with the highest growth rates now registered in Asia. China’s quest for
energy and energy security is now a fundamental feature of its international diplomacy
in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Russia, altering the global
energy security equation.
The inherent instability in regions that provide most of the world’s oil and gas
constitutes a grave concern. Instable governments like Venezuela contribute
to sudden supply reductions, using oil and gas as political weapons with severe
global consequences. Both China and India are more than ready to take advantage
of it, and have consequently been invited to participate in the Venezuelan
oil industry. Pipeline networks are also diplomatic tools through which exporting
countries as well as transshipment countries can exercise political, diplomatic and
economic leverage.
The political and security risks in Venezuela’s energy investment environment are
largely associated with legislation that centralizes power around President Hugo
Chávez. The management of Venezuelan oil company PDVSA has become
New Faces Conference 2006 52
Panel II:
Energy Security
increasingly politicized, with money for maintenance and development being diverted
to pay for a surge in public spending. Nevertheless, the country has sufficient
resources to maintain its high level of production. Politics and ideology are
driving the confrontation, as President Chávez seeks to limit American influence
around the world, starting in Venezuela’s oil fields. The Venezuelan President
recently decreed that Venezuela would take control of heavy oil fields in the Orinoco
Belt, a region southeast of Caracas of so much potential that some experts
say it could give the country more reserves than Saudi Arabia. The United States
Geological Survey describes the area as the “largest single hydrocarbon accumulation
in the world,” making it highly coveted despite Mr. Chávez’s erratic policies.17
A decent energy security policy should stay loyal to market principles and not
treat energy as personal revenue for governments. The most important objective
of an energy security policy is to create stable conditions under which the market
will determine the appropriate use of the resources. Market integration via
interdependency might be the most important element of such an energy security
strategy.
17 Simón Romero & Clifford Krauss, High Stakes: Chávez Plays the Oil Card, in: The New York Times, April 10, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/business/worldbusiness/10showdown.html?ei=5087&em=&en=aad2996f4a
ca8b0f&ex=1176350400&pagewanted=all>.
Mehmet Tezcan elaborating on Turkey’s foreign energy policy
A Division of Tasks between
ENP and the EMP
53
New Faces Conference 2006
The ENP and the EMP: Exploring a Division of Tasks
between
Overlapping Initiatives
Eduard Soler i Lecha
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process,
has received extensive criticism. In spite of the enormous expectations that
it created in 1995 and the ambitious goals inscribed in the Barcelona Declaration,
the results are not satisfactory. The Barcelona declaration specified that the
Partnership should transform “the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue,
exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity which
require a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable
and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty
and promotion of greater understanding between cultures.” Despite these goals,
the EMP has made minimal progress and its accomplishments have not acquired
adequate visibility.
As for the goal of transforming the Mediterranean into a secure and stable area,
one should note that major regional conflicts such as in the Western Sahara as
well as in the Middle East remain unresolved. There has not been a significant
improvement of neither democratic nor human rights standards on the Southern
Shore. As for the economic dimension, in spite of the fact that most southern
countries have signed association agreements, which would allow for the creation
of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area in the future, south-south integration
remains weak, and such advances have not led to the extension of prosperity in
the region. On the contrary, the World Bank reports that regional imbalances
have increased. For instance, in 1995 Spain’s GNP per capita was eleven times
higher than that of Morocco, in 2002 it was thirteen times higher. Simultaneously,
European investors have not yet sought to invest in the economies of these
countries. The cultural and social dimensions of the Barcelona process, which
encompass a great variety of areas including the promotion of civil society and
people-to-people dialogue, have been considered the “Cinderella” of the EMP: a
basket full of rhetoric but empty of content.
Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona, 28 November 1995, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm>.
EuroMeSCo’s 2005 report, entitled “Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic
States,” <http://www.euromesco.net/media/barcelonaplus_en_fin.pdf> is a useful tool to understand the developments
and deficits of the political basket during the last decade.
In total, investments towards MPCs represent only 1 per cent of European foreign investment.
As for the cultural dimension see Paul Balta, La culture: le parent pauvre, in: Euroméditerranée, un projet à réinventer,
in: Confluences, Fall 2000, pp. 69-80. In recent years there have been some advances in the cultural dimension, such as
the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation and some projects in the education field. Nevertheless, there has been no
relevant progress on aspects such as human migration.
Eduard Soler i Lecha
New Faces Conference 2006 54
Panel III:
ENP or EU-Enlargement?
The EMP is at risk. As this paper will demonstrate, different initiatives and
particularly the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could marginalize this
eleven-year-old project, which, at least rhetorically, offered a cooperation framework
and equal footing between the EU and Mediterranean countries. This paper
will give a brief overview of different cooperation frameworks that can compete
with the EMP. It will concentrate on the functioning and aims of the ENP, and
propose a division of tasks between the ENP and the EMP. A division of labor
could mutually reinforce both policies and could be beneficial for citizens on
both shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
Alternatives to the Barcelona Process
In 2005, Barcelona hosted an extraordinary Euro-Mediterranean summit. For
the first time, benefiting from the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP), the Heads of State and Government from 35 European and
Mediterranean countries convened in the Catalan capital in order to revamp a
stagnant framework. This revitalization was particularly urgent due to the existence
of other regional and sub-regional initiatives, which risked substituting or at
least eroding the centrality of the EMP. Some of them existed before the launching
of the EMP, i. e. the 5 + 5 (a Euro-Maghreb cooperation framework) or the
Mediterranean Forum. Some are led by non-Mediterranean actors, such as the
Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). Two other initiatives
are genuinely European and could potentially substitute the EMP: the Strategic
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the European
Neighbourhood Policy.
The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Spanish Parliament
about the preparation of the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean summit, perfectly illustrated
the fear of EMP substitution or marginalization. Miguel Ángel Moratinos
explained that the summit would take place at a very critical moment for the
future of Euro-Mediterranean relations, since the EU was simultaneously discussing
the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the
Middle East. According to his speech, Spain wishes to prevent the ENP from
becoming a hidden pre-accession strategy for Eastern Europe, and to ensure that
The 5+5 was supported mainly by France in the late eighties and includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Malta,
Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. In recent years, it has reinforced the justice and home affairs and
the defense dimensions. The Mediterranean Forum has a slightly larger membership. It is a French-Egyptian initiative,
which functions as an informal mechanism to exchange ideas among Mediterranean countries before the Euro-Mediterranean
meetings.
A Division of Tasks between
ENP and the EMP
55
New Faces Conference 2006
the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East does not
draw the EU’s attention away from the Barcelona Process.
In spite of these fears, the Strategic Partnership is no longer a real threat to the
survival of the EMP. It can be considered a project responding to the US-led
BMENA. Under the Irish EU presidency in 2004, the UK stressed this initiative.
With the Strategic Partnership, the EU proposed a single framework for cooperation
with the members of the Barcelona Process, as well as for the rest of
the Arab world and Iran. Nevertheless, this initiative was considerably diluted by
member states (mainly Spain), which feared EMP substitution. Consequently, the
Strategic Partnership became little more than a document without an institutional
mechanism or funds.
In contrast, the ENP still presents a real threat (but simultaneously an opportunity)
for the survival of the EMP. The ENP was originally designed for eastern
European countries that were to become EU neighbors after the 2004 and 2007
enlargements (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Belarus). Subsequently, the members
of the Barcelona Process, with the exception of Turkey (considered an EU
See Comparecencia del señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Moratinos Cuyaubé), para informar
sobre las líneas generales de la política de su departamento, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (asuntos
exteriores), VII legislatura, n. 24, 19 May 2005, p. 7.
These impressions were confirmed through several interviews in Brussels in July 2005 with diplomats in charge of the
Mediterranean dossier in several EU Member States’ Permanent Representations and in some delegations of the EU
Mediterranean countries.
Eduard Soler and Kathrin Brockmann during the debate on enlargement alternatives
New Faces Conference 2006 56
Panel III:
ENP or EU-Enlargement?
candidate), Libya and the three South Caucasus republics were also integrated
into the same strategy.
The rationale behind the ENP is rooted in enlargement policy. EU member states
have confirmed that enlargement policy is the most effective tool to gain real
influence in third countries. However, the EU is not willing to extend the membership
perspective further. Consequently, the EU needs to offer an alternative
for those countries in Eastern Europe, which would like to become members but
are not offered that option by the EU. Correspondingly, the southern and eastern
Mediterranean countries, as well as most of the EU Mediterranean members,
have recognized (and still recognize) that the EU has been overly focused on
eastern integration at the expense of southern cooperation. They therefore advocated
enlarging the geographic scope of this new policy to include the eastern as
well as the southern EU neighbors.
The EU has tried to replicate the enlargement method (gradualist, result-oriented
and focused on the negotiation of the acquis) for those who are not to become
EU candidates. However, if the EU is not able to offer the same incentives, it
cannot expect the same commitments from its neighbors. This characterizes the
nature of the ENP and its goals. The ENP is a bilateral policy which gives a “à
la carte” model for cooperation with third countries. The EU promises concrete
progress towards further integration of the third country into the EU internal
market and offers it further areas of cooperation in several fields. In exchange,
the EU asks for definite and demonstrable commitments to political, legal, economic
and technical reform.
This policy consists of: (a) a General Strategy, based on the guiding principles
of the ENP; (b) Country Reports, issued by the European Commission, which
scrutinize the situation of the neighboring country in multiple areas; (c) Action
Plans, also proposed by the European Commission, but negotiated with the third
country and specifying in which areas the third country should pursue further
reform, as well as what the EU can offer to accompany these reforms and what
it can offer as “award” when these reforms are satisfactorily fulfilled; and (d) the
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which merges the two
programs TACIS and MEDA into a single fund.
The mere existence of this single fund illustrates to what extent the supporters
of the EMP have reasonable fear concerning the dilution of the EMP into the
Regarding the links of the ENP and the enlargement method and experience see: Judith Keeley, New Wine in Old
Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy, in: Journal of Common
Market Studies, No. 1/2005, pp. 29-55.
A Division of Tasks between
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ENP. Some would evidently like the ENP to disappear and for Europe to revert
to the pre-2004 situation. But the ENP is permanent. The best way not to bury
the EMP’s future is to find an appropriate division of tasks between the two initiatives.
This requires exploring areas in which the EMP can provide an advantage
and in which fields both projects can be mutually and reciprocally reinforcing.
Proposing a Division of Tasks
Before proposing a division of tasks, one should delineate five different scenarios
within a five to ten year framework. The first consists of the complete substitution
of the EMP with the ENP. The second is to maintain both initiatives, while
marginalizing the EMP, like the Western European Union in terms of security.
The third is to maintain both with an effective division of tasks. In the fourth
scenario, both initiatives remain active but pursue contradictory goals and hamper
each other’s respective progress. The fifth consists of the failure of the ENP
to offer concrete incentives or deliver substantial results. The last scenario may
imply maintaining the old EMP as the only functioning framework for regional
cooperation. Neither the first two options, nor the last two, are satisfactory for
the interests of the EU or the Mediterranean, as they would damage the EU’s
credibility. This paper will therefore elaborate on the remaining scenario, which
calls for a fruitful division of tasks between the ENP and the EMP.
Robert Khorolskyy and Quijun Zhou discuss their perspectives on energy policy
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Tobias Schumacher foresaw that the ENP would concentrate on bilateral issues
and on very specific topics, while the EMP would focus on multilateral and
institutional dimensions. In five to ten years time, the ENP could concentrate on
the purely bilateral dimension, with very specific goals, which could be framed in
a larger Euro-Mediterranean forum. To give an example, the Action Plans, which
could be adopted in the following years, should take into account the guidelines
fixed in the Euro-Mediterranean five-year working plan, which was adopted at the
2005 Barcelona summit.
Besides fulfilling this guiding role, other elements would justify maintaining the
EMP. The Barcelona Process is recognized as being the only forum to bring
Israel and its Arab neighbors to the same table, not only at a ministerial level but
also among lower ranking officials. In contrast, the ENP is a vertical European
policy, devoid of the regional perspective or south-south dialogue. Thus, these
south-south contacts are the greatest assets of the EMP.
Political willingness is the only way to reinforce the utility and the visibility of this
dimension of the EMP. Many differences prevail among its 35 members. Besides
the classical north-south divide, several north-north and south-south divisions
exist. In order to reduce the harmful effects of these divisions, ad hoc or stable
north-south, north-north and south-south alliances need to be established. Simultaneously,
stronger institutions need to be built.10
The institutional structure and the functioning of the EMP have received extensive
criticism, primarily due to their Eurocentric character.11 In recent years,
however, there have been some steps to rectify this aspect of the EMP, such as
the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly or the Anna
Lindh Foundation. There have been proposals to establish a system of Co-presidencies
(north-south), a Permanent Secretariat, and a Mr./Ms. Mediterranean or a
Euro-Mediterranean Bank, though these have not made any headway. Nevertheless,
these institutions could potentially reinforce the feeling of ownership in the
Barcelona Process, provide more visibility for its achievements, and, more importantly,
consolidate the institutional dimension that the ENP lacks, thus giving the
EMP a concrete purpose.
Tobias Schumacher, Riding the Winds of Change: the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: The International
Spectator, No. 2/2004, pp. 89–102 (p. 91).
10 For further details see: Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona + 10: Cleavages and Alliances, in: CFSP Forum, No. 2, March
2006, <http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%204%20no%202.pdf>.
11 As for the institutional dimension of the EMP see: Dorothée Schmid, Les institutions européennes dans le fonctionnement
du PEM : de la répartition des compétences à la gestion dynamique du quotidien (EuroMesco Paper 36),
October 2004, <http://www.euromesco.net/media/euromescopaper36_schmid.pdf>.
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Taking these factors into account, a useful division of tasks could be as follows.
Due to its gradualist, bilateral, flexible, and results-oriented nature, the ENP is
likely to obtain a greater level of success by concentrating on most of the policy
issues. In contrast, the EMP could focus on politics through stronger institutions
and both regular ministerial and under-ministerial contacts, as well as on some
policies requiring south-south cooperation. This would include several aspects
of transport, energy, environment and, to some extent, education, migration and
cooperation in justice and home affairs.
As for the reinforcement of the political dimension, three factors are necessary.
The first involves the positive evolution at the international level towards resolving
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Experience shows that the greatest advances in
Euro-Mediterranean relations occurred when there was some optimism regarding
the solution of this conflict. During the worst phases of the conflict, the
EMP suffered from the atmosphere created by the Arab-Israeli hostilities. This
hampered progress in fields such as security negotiations (e.g. the approval of a
Charter for Peace and Stability in 2000) and polluted the discussions. The second
factor is stronger leadership and increased political willingness. EMP progress
cannot rely solely upon the willingness of southern European countries. Both the
Mediterranean partners and the non-Mediterranean EU members have to show
a stronger commitment to the EMP and to solving the different challenges of
that region in general. Undoubtedly, Italy, France and Spain will continue to lead
the project. This leadership needs reinforcement, although it is crucial to prevent
competition between these three countries. There is also the possibility for the
other 32 members of the EMP to assume leadership in various fields. The third
and final factor would be ambitious institutional reform. As mentioned, the current
initiatives of the Barcelona Process require increased public visibility, as do
the existing EMP institutions such as the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Creating new institutions would also help
reach the threefold objective of increased visibility, ownership, and effectiveness.
The creation of a Permanent Secretariat might be a way to achieve these goals.
In parallel, the EU will need to assure the success of the bilateral policy dimension
of the ENP and of the few policies that are designed and implemented
regionally. If the EU wants to remain a credible and central partner for the southern
and eastern Mediterranean countries, it cannot afford another failure. Perceived
as such, the EU may need to revise to what extent the incentives offered
by the ENP appeal to its new and old neighbors, and whether it will be able to
deliver what it has promised. In contrast to the EMP, it is still too early to evaluNew
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ENP or EU-Enlargement?
ate the outcomes and shortcomings of the ENP. Nevertheless, there is a serious
risk that the ENP might fall short of its expectations.
Conclusion
There is room for the mutual coexistence and reciprocal reinforcement of the
ENP and the EMP. Some still fear a “Mediterraneist school,” which does not
appreciate the purely bilateral level of the ENP and which anxiously foresees the
swallowing of the EMP by the ENP. However, a careful analysis of the strengths
and the weaknesses of both initiatives may lead to a stable and fruitful division of
tasks between the Barcelona Process and the Neighborhood Policy. The Barcelona
Process would concentrate on policies and regional integration (mainly southsouth),
the politics of Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the institutional dimension.
The ENP would provide the framework for increasing the effectiveness of
most policies currently included in the Barcelona Process and would manage the
overwhelming majority of the funds. A clear and shared strategy, stronger leadership,
an enlarged and more diversified political willingness, and concrete and reliable
incentives will ensure visible success for both the EMP and the ENP.
John Byrom presents an inside view on US counter-insurgency strategies
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
A New Security Provider for Central Asia?
Natalia Touzovskaia
The war on terror re-opened a Pandora’s box of security challenges in Central
Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a six-nation group that
includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has
rapidly been gaining influence in the changing context of regional security. Today
India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia have obtained observer status. After celebrating
its fifth anniversary in Shanghai in June 2006, the SCO found itself facing
even more questions than at the time of its creation in 2001. To some extent
this is due to the participation of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad
at the summit who talked of Iran’s intention to join the organization. Hosting
controversial visitors is only a part of a complex future that the SCO faces at the
moment. The institution is still in search of its own identity. While its agenda has
widened and now embraces discussions of economic and energy security cooperation,
in practice its members have narrowed their joint activity to anti-terrorist
exercises and most of these efforts are still implemented on a bilateral basis.
The following questions arise in this context: to what extent can this organization
become an efficient security provider despite the differences among its members?
How could it help solve regional security problems? How could the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization fit into the overall picture of the region and interact with
other security actors? This paper will look at the evolution of the organization
and its latest developments, analyze limitations of its capabilities, and examine its
prospects as a security provider in the region.
In Search of Identity: “A New Model of Successful International Cooperation” or
“Oriental NATO”?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established on June 15th, 2001.
China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics, excluding Turkmenistan
(which has a neutral status), signed the Shanghai Declaration, formally setting up
a new framework for future cooperation. In practice, however, this document
grew out of agreements on measures of mutual trust and on joint reduction of
armed forces between three Central Asian countries, Russia, and China. These
initial agreements were signed during a series of meetings of the so-called Shang-
Natalia Touzovskaia
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hai Five Forum in the 1990s. At that time, Uzbekistan did not participate in the
Shanghai Five Forum because of its strong anti-Russian stance.
The Forum was created in order to tackle traditional security challenges in the
region, which some analysts in Russia call “the Soviet heritage.” The disintegration
of the Soviet Union left Russia and the Central Asian republics with unsettled
disputes over one of the longest borders in the world, the border with
China. This was successfully resolved after Russia and China initiated a settlement
process. Moscow and Beijing have signed a series of agreements since 1990 and
a bilateral treaty in 2001 that reiterated the absence of territorial claims. Bilateral
agreements between Beijing and the Central Asian states were concluded in
1994–2000.
It soon became clear that the border issue was not the only problem requiring
collective action. New challenges and threats, primarily terrorist and radical
Islamist activities, illegal drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking, illegal
migration and shortage of water supplies have caused Russia and China to unite
their efforts. The rise of the Taliban in 1996 in neighboring Afghanistan also
helped boost this cooperation. To a certain extent the Central Asian republics,
China, and Russia were pioneers facing a whole set of modern challenges long
before they entered the security agenda of the West. Their deliberate attempt
to unite their efforts shows the limits of unilateral action when trying to handle
new threats. Even Uzbekistan, which does not share a border with China, positioned
itself as an independent player in the region and decided to take part in
the SCO. This caught the attention of many analysts at the time. The creation of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appeared as an achievement in enhanced
regional cooperation.
Within five years the SCO has formally developed a wide range of tools to
improve its performance, especially on an institutional level. The initial structures
adopted are as follows: the Council (heads of states), the Council (heads
of governments), Foreign Ministers Council, Meetings of Ministers, Council of
The term “Shanghai Five” was introduced in 1996 at the summit in Shanghai between five heads of states, although
meetings of these five powers have been taking place since the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991.
A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, Shankhaiskaya Organizacia Sotrudnichestva: strukturnoe oformlenie i perspektivy razvitia, in:
Analiticheskie Zapiski (MGIMO MFA RF), February 2005, No. 2, p. 4.
The Shanghai Five states had already officially condemned religious extremism and international terrorism in the
Almaty declaration signed in July 1998. A year later they agreed to adopt a set of common measures to tackle these
challenges.
I. Facon, Les enjeux de sécurité en Asie Centrale: la politique de la Russie, in: Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales
(AFRI), 2004, p. 658, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/etudes-recherches_3119/annu
aire-francais-relations-internationales_3123/afri-2004_2443 0.html>.
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National Coordinators, and the Secretariat (based in Beijing). The first Secretary
nominated was the former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Deguang. The
Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) was first introduced in Tashkent in 2004,
which some analysts see as a key SCO tool to promote regional security. During
the last two years this institutional structure expanded and shifted its emphasis
from antiterrorist tools to economic cooperation and energy security. The SCO
Business Forum took place in September 2006 in Kazakhstan and experts are
currently discussing an initiative to create the SCO Energy Club.
The organization of the core SCO document provides an elaborate conceptual
basis for SCO performance. This “Charter,” signed on July 7th, 2002 in St. Petersburg,
states a broad range of principles shared among all members: equality
of all participants, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member
states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes,
openness to the participation of others, and the agreement not to target third
states or any international organizations. It is these principles that make the SCO
particularly attractive to its participants. If Russia and China had declared these
principles to be essential elements of their foreign policy early on and had kept
emphasizing their importance during the 1990s, the Central Asian states would
have been more likely to adhere to them because these principles would not
threaten their newly-acquired sovereignty after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. In practice, non-interference in internal affairs brings benefits not as
much to states, but to their regimes. It offers them stability and maintains their
status quo in the region, yet another advantage that the SCO can bring to political
elites in troubled Central Asia. Moreover, the stated equality among SCO participants
makes the organization even more attractive to small countries despite the
participation of regional giants such as Moscow and Beijing.
Another document sometimes recognized as the SCO’s contribution to international
law is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and
Extremism, signed in July 2001. It gives clear definitions of all the three notions
(“three evils” according to Chinese interpretation):
– Terrorism: “an action with intent to cause death of a civilian … as well as
planning, aiding and abetting an action for the purpose of intimidating the
Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter), Chapters 4–11, adopted on June 7th, 2002, in
St.-Petersburg, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2002/06/106755.shtml>.
A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij (fn. 2), p. 12.
A. Khasenov, U SCO budet svoi energeticheskii klub, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006, p. 8.
A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, (fn. 2), p. 8.
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population, disrupting social security and forcing authorities or an international
organization to commit an action or restrain from it …”
– Separatism: “an action with intent to break a territorial integrity of a state,
including separating a part of its territory, its violent disintegration, as well
as planning to aid and abet such an action …”
– Extremism: “an action with purpose of a violent seizure of power, violent
hold of power and violent change of constitutional order, as well as social
security violation, including organizing illegal armed formations and participating
in them.”
These definitions form a reference point for international law, which member
state officials praise as “a new model of successful international cooperation.”10
Yet from the very beginning the range of SCO activities remained very broad.
They included economic issues, energy dialogue and the use of natural resources,
emergency relief, transport and communications, scientific, technical and cultural
cooperation.11 Such a variety showed that the field for cooperation and the number
of issues requiring collective efforts was vast, but it also raised the question
of SCO identity. It is still unclear today how the SCO can help solve regional
security problems.
While Russian experts emphasize multilateralism, dialogue, and strong antiterrorist
tools,12 Western and especially American analysts point out that the SCO is
gradually developing a confrontational attitude towards the US and often label it
as “Oriental NATO” or “OPEC with nuclear weapons.”13 Lately this anti-American
stance of the SCO has gained popularity among Moscow officials as well as
in the Russian press.14 Some Russian officials have made quite eloquent remarks
while avoiding any explicit statement on the issue.15
The US has made progress in the region since the start of the global war on terror.
The anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan proved to be a strong consolidat-
Shankhaiskaia Konvencia o bor’be s terrorizmom, separatizmom i extremizmom, June 15th, 2001, <http://www.
ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf/0/d160d59ec0ac159043 256b560053735a?OpenDocument>.
10 V. Putin, SCO – Novaya Model’ Uspeshnogo Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva, in: Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 14th,
2004.
11 Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter—fn. 5), Chapter 3.
12 A. Kokoshin, ShOS formiruet “poias druzhby” vdol’ granic Rossii, <http://shanhai.rfn.ru/interviews/doc.
html?id=43 8>.
13 G. Dyer, R. McGregor, Opposition to US inspires “NATO of the East.” Is Shanghai Cooperation Organization a
Threat to the West?, in: The Financial Times, June 22nd, 2006.
14 Some of the recent articles in Nezavisimaya Gazeta describe the SCO as “a NATO competitor.” See: A. Blinov, ShOS
Mozhet Stat’ Konkurentom NATO, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 20th, 2006.
15 For instance, President Vladimir Putin admitted that the creation of the SCO reflected “the necessity for new centres
of power” in the region. See interview in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006, and P. Sonders, Na blizkom
rasstoianii i bez kopania v dushe, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006.
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ing factor for the development of the SCO and boosted the institution’s activity
as an opposition to American presence. The prevalence of anti-Americanism,
however, does not always imply that cooperation with the West has lost ground
in the region. In reality, the situation is more nuanced. The SCO states (with the
exception of China) initially saw US military presence in the region as a strong
means to tackle the Taliban threat.16 Originally, SCO states considered US presence
to be linked directly to the military campaign in Afghanistan rather than
a permanent institution. They examined it in quite pragmatic terms as another
tool to keep the situation under control.17 It was only after the security situation
in Afghanistan started to deteriorate, extremist movements had regained ground,
and drug trafficking had grown substantially, that the criticism of American presence
in Central Asia became quite open. Moreover, the closure of the US base
in Uzbekistan was more a reaction to the US criticism of the Andijan tragedy
of May 2005 and to the subsequent cut of the financial aid Washington granted
Tashkent (after the agreement reached on October 7th, 2001 concerning the military
base), than a substantial policy change. Germany was allowed to keep its base
in Termez because it took a low-key approach to the events in Andijan,18 and is
now the only NATO country which deploys troops in Uzbekistan. Despite talks
of leaving Termez as a sign of solidarity with the US,19 the German military acknowledges
its importance for an anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.20 At the
same time the US and Kyrgyz authorities have finally reached a new agreement
concerning the Manas base, which currently serves as one of the key NATO
bases in the region. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US and France used the Kulob
base in Tajikistan on the basis of bilateral agreements.21 This base has continued
to operate as a NATO transit point since 2004.
Even before Washington’s active presence in the region, the fight against the
“three evils” has been at the heart of the SCO agenda and was initially strongly
emphasized by the member states suggesting the institution’s identity could have
developed in that direction. Indeed, all of the SCO states are facing all three
challenges. Russia is coping with terrorism, extremism and separatism, including
fighting Chechen separatists and groups of religious extremists in the Northern
16 I. Facon (Fn. 4), p. 659.
17 I. Zviagelskaya, Central’naya Azia: evolucia parametrov bezopasnosti i stabil’nosti, in: Yuzhnyi Flang SNG.
Central’naya Azia, Kaspii-Kavkaz: energetika i politika, Moscow 2005, p. 38. See also: I. Facon (Fn. 4), p. 663.
18 Uzbek allow Germany to keep base, in: BBC News, December 11th, 2005.
19 Uzbekistan: Germany Likely to Leave Uzbek Base, February 1st, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/
02/70a79f46-8130-4757-b36a-4690670d30c6.html>.
20 Interview with Colonel Yury Morozov, Head of Research Task Group on Russia-NATO security cooperation in CIS
space, Institute of Europe (RAS), Moscow, October 2006.
21 V. Socor, NATO Leader Makes Historic Visit to Central Asia, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 25th, 2004, <http://
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3118&article_id=2368742>.
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Caucasus. China is preoccupied with activities of the Ouigour separatists in the
western province of Xingjian. The Central Asian republics have long been fighting
extremists groups and religious organizations, the most influential ones being
“Hizb ut Tahrir” and the extremist religious movement “Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan.” In 2001 this organization renamed itself to “Islamic Movement of
Turkistan” (IMT), implying that it aimed at establishing a theocratic Islamic state
not only in the Fergana valley in Uzbekistan but throughout Central Asia.22 In
1999–2000 there were a number of armed uprisings in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
organized by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and supported by Tajik
and Afghan extremists. Currently the IMT is included in the State Department’s
list of international terrorist groups.
Regardless of their interest in combining efforts in the fight against terrorism,
most of the SCO activities have been implemented on a bilateral basis. There
has been only one multilateral anti-terrorist exercise so far, “Interaction—2003,”
which took place in August 2003 between Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan. The rest of the exercises have been accomplished bilaterally:
China and Kyrgyzstan organized joint exercises in October 2002, joint Chinese-
Russian military exercises were held in August 2005, and Chinese-Kazakh
anti-terrorist exercises took place in August 2006. The Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS) remains more of a project than a reality. This organization was
created in 2002 for the purpose of collecting and analyzing data on terrorists and
extremist activities, intelligence sharing, and legal cooperation. Although it became
operational in June 2004, its main activities still remain only on paper. The
information exchange between SCO states as well as the sharing of intelligence is
in a very initial phase. Even Chinese officials, who were rather enthusiastic about
RATS at the beginning, showed less optimism in their more recent statements.23
“The Big Two” versus “The Small Three”
To some degree, the SCO consists of two groups of countries. China and Russia
play a leading role within the organization (implied by the choice of the SCO
official languages: Russian and Chinese). On the one hand, the Central Asian
states have so far accepted this leadership, also backed by Beijing and Moscow
downplaying human rights issues and undemocratic trends in the political
developments of the region. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan sometimes join their efforts within the SCO as the so-called “Small
22 See L. Montanaro-Jankovki, Les coopérations sécuritaires face à la criminalité transnationales en Asie Centrale, in:
Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales (AFRI), 2005, p. 359.
23 The Chinese Vice-Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei noted on August 21st, 2006 during one of its pressconferences
that RATS developments were rather “satisfactory,” <http://www.china.org.cn/russian/255128.html>.
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Three.” Looking at the level of economic performance of the SCO members,
this division is natural: while China, Russia and, to some extent, Kazakhstan have
relatively strong economies, the three Central Asian economies in comparison
are extremely weak. Today an average salary in Kyrgyzstan, still high relative to
neighboring Tajikistan, amounts to 20 USD per month and in some regions to 5
USD per month.24
Such a division however serves mostly as a tool to trace the different agendas of
each group of countries and examine the disputes that exist within each of these
groups. Besides, Kazakhstan does not currently seek a position within one group.
Due to its strong economic performance (9,5% economic growth in 2004) and its
growing role as an energy supplier in international markets, Astana wishes to be
recognized as a regional leader,25 gradually leading to competition with Russia and
other Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan in particular), also claiming regional
leadership.
A Chinese-Russian Couple: Bones of Contention
Beijing strongly supported the creation of the SCO because it saw a chance to
pursue its old security agenda with new means. In fact, the SCO contributed to
solving three of China’s major concerns:
– territorial integrity and the fight with Ouigour separatism in Xingjian;
– promoting a model of a multipolar world and projecting power into Central
Asia with the long-term objective of effecting a “Big Nation” renaissance;
– solving the growing need for energy supplies.26
All three have been addressed: political issues have been negotiated within the
SCO framework and energy security questions have been discussed on a bilateral
basis, mainly with Kazakhstan and Russia. Beijing signed a number of deals with
Astana for long-term investments of $8 billion and agreed to build a pipeline
from Kazakhstan to Western China.27 However, power projection in Central Asia
remains problematic because of Russian dominance, and Beijing has so far been
very cautious in this regard. Yet the ambitions remain and are pursued by other
means. China tends to highlight the necessity of stronger economic cooperation,
24 I. Zviagelskaya (fn. 17), p. 43 .
25 See Kazakhstan seeks recognition as regional leader, ISN Security Watch (ETH Zurich), September 26th, 2006,
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16722>.
26 A. Jafalian, Equilibres Géopolitiques en Asie Centrale: la montée en puissance de la Chine, in: Annuaire Stratégique et
Militaire, Paris 2005, p. 136.
27 Ibid., p. 140.
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which would put it in a stronger economic position than Moscow. At the same
time, Beijing never misses the opportunity to act on a bilateral basis in order to
gain political dividends with smaller states. After the tragic events in Andijan in
2005, when Moscow did not react immediately, Beijing was the first to welcome
President Islam Karimov with an official visit.
To some extent Russia’s agenda is similar to that of China. Moscow is concerned
with promoting a model of a multipolar world and spreading its influence in
Central Asia after a long period of retreat from the region in the 1990s. Energy
security has become an issue of growing importance over the last two years,
especially after the gas crisis with Ukraine. In fact, it was Moscow who proposed
the creation of the SCO Energy Club in 2006.
Though officially relations between Russia and China are currently “at their best
[level]… in our entire history,”28 the agendas of these two leading countries create
inherent competition. Today there are three areas of emerging differences:
– Agenda priorities: Beijing believes economic issues should be given the same
priority as the fight against terrorism and should receive even more attention
in the future. Moscow still underscores the importance of its security agenda
and prioritizes only the energy dialogue among economic issues.
– Models of economic cooperation: according to Moscow, economic integration
is a long-term goal and current cooperation should be enhanced among
the countries with similar levels of economic development. In contrast,
China with its impressive economic potential insists that a common economic
partnership is necessary in the near future.
– Views on further enlargement: China accuses Russia of a pro-Indian stance
and strongly objected to providing New Delhi with the status of an SCO
observer.29 There are also disagreements between the two countries on how
far the SCO should extend its zone of responsibility.
Unresolved Issues among “The Small Three”
Among the three Central Asian republics there are even more serious discords
than between the two leaders of the SCO. The disputes between “The Small
Three” date back to the time they became Soviet republics, and today are aggravated
by more recent ethnic and religious divides in the region.
28 Vladimir Putin in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006.
29 S. Luzianin. „ShOS ne speshit raspakhivat’ dveri, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 26th, 2006, p. 76.
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Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan
The borders still remain undefined between these two countries and the prospect
of settlement looks grim. There are 70 to 100 areas of dispute, depending on different
readings of old Soviet borders.30 The delimitation process has been complicated
by two Uzbek enclaves on Kyrgyz territory (Sokh and Shakhimardan)
and one Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan (Barak).
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan
The border between these countries is also not delimited. There are about 70
contentious areas and a Tajik enclave (Vorukh) in Kyrgyz territory that was
already the centre of Kyrgyzo-Tajik ethnic tensions in Soviet times. Moreover,
the situation is currently deteriorating due to growing activity of radical Islamist
groups. The armed incursions of radicals on Kyrgyz territory in 1999/2000 came
from the territory of Tajikistan. According to Kyrgyz authorities, this provides
solid proof that there are extremist training camps operating on Tajik territory.31
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan
Potentially the most disrupting problems for the region lie in Tajiko-Uzbek relations,
complicated by long-standing and unresolved ethnic conflict. A community
of one million Uzbek inhabitants plays an active role in Tajik internal political
life, and there are five million Tajik individuals in Uzbekistan, though they are
less active in the politics of the country. The ethnic Tajik population, which
amounts to one fourth of the whole population of Uzbekistan, lives mainly in
the poorest areas along the Tajiko-Uzbek border and reportedly has links to radical
Islamist groups. During the 1999/2000 uprisings, some Tajiks supported the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan radicals. As a result, Uzbek authorities are currently
resettling ethnic Tajiks by force. The Uzbeko-Tajik border is systematically
mined from the Uzbek side, leading to numerous civilian casualties.32
The SCO has not tried to settle these issues, and none of the problems mentioned
so far have been discussed within the organization’s framework, though it
could have had a real impact on the situation given its unique and very successful
experience settling the border between former Soviet republics and China.
Apart from internal disputes of the member states, the relations between the
two groups of countries have not always been smooth. The most controversial
issue turned out to be the question of SCO enlargement. The “Small Three”
30 Uzbekistan insists the border should be delimited on the basis of a 1924 map, while Bishkek suggests a 1954 version.
See ibid., p. 81.
31 Luzianin (fn. 29)., p. 83.
32 Ibid., p. 85.
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strongly objected to expanding the membership and including India and Pakistan
because of the continued conflict in Kashmir. They contend that since many
existing problems have yet to be solved, the organization should not use its
scarce resources in other areas.33 As a result, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were
only granted observer status in 2005. A contact group with Afghanistan was also
created, but full Afghan membership was never approved. In 2006, Iran showed
serious interest in membership and participated in the SCO Shanghai summit,
thereby also attaining observer status. However, Teheran’s participation created
great controversy from the beginning, causing vivid debates between member
states and eliciting a strong international response.34 In the end, SCO enlargement
was suspended after discussions at the eve of the Shanghai summit.
Prospects of SCO development
Several factors demonstrate the serious limitations of the SCO as a security provider:
implicit and explicit disputes between member states, their different agendas
and priorities, the significant role of external factors, which to some extent
consolidate institutional development more than internal dynamics, and an inability
to solve key security problems of the region even between member states.
It would be presumptuous to expect a five-year-old organization that includes
more than one third of the world’s population and operates in one of the most
instable regions in the world to become an efficient mechanism of regional cooperation.
It does, however, have the potential to become an active player since
the SCO has so far provided an attractive model of cooperation for both regional
giants and small regional powers, and draws attention of other key Asian actors.
The question remains as to what extent this model serves as a common ground
for all members or simply allows each of them to follow their own agendas. In
order to make the SCO a viable regional institution, its members will have to
agree on a number of common issues that have previously caused dispute between
them:
– the zone of responsibility and future enlargement;
– further forms of cooperation in already prioritized fields: fight against
terrorism (in particular enhancing the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
activity), extremist groups and drug trafficking, future modes of economic
cooperation;
33 Luzianin (Fn. 29), p. 7.
34 Iranian President to cause a stir at security summit, in: The Financial Times, June 14th, 2006. The US also applied for
observer status in the SCO but the application was rejected. Among the other countries who expressed interest in the
SCO are Japan and Belarus.
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– solving old disputes between member states, in particular the border problems
of the Central Asian republics;
– interaction with other regional organizations, such as the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and international players in the region, such as
NATO.
Questions also arise regarding the prospects of cooperation with Western players.
How might Western powers and security institutions plug into this regional game?
The US and NATO are already operative in the region. NATO, in particular
having taken greater responsibility for the military operation in Afghanistan in
October 2006, simply cannot afford to ignore any possibility of cooperation with
regional actors. Currently though, NATO engages in another channel of dialogue
with the Central Asian countries through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program
that has so far proved to be more efficient than multilateral dialogue. This is
particularly true in the case of Kazakhstan which upgraded its relations with the
Alliance from PfP to the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The Uzbek
IPAP program, however, has been suspended after the Andijan tragedy. At the
same time, NATO maintains its dialogue with Russia through the NATO-Russia
Council and holds a joint program in training specialists to fight against the trafficking
of illegal drugs in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Russia’s position towards strategic alliances is presented by Natalia Touzovskaia
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However, the Alliance should not downplay the SCO channels since the security
situation in Afghanistan is currently deteriorating, an issue that will continue to
dominate the regional agenda. NATO could also be more attractive for Central
Asian states since it provides a multilateral framework and has a more positive image
in the region than the US. Potentially the most fruitful field of cooperation for
the Alliance could be the fight against drug trafficking. However, NATO currently
restrains itself from this issue. In order to stabilize the region in the long term,
this issue requires serious attention. Joint training programs with Russia are not
enough. As Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov pointed out, since the start of
the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, the turnover of drug
trafficking in the region has more than doubled and has continued to grow since.35
In the near future it is unlikely that the SCO could enter into any serious competition
with Western institutions, mainly because it still needs to develop itself as a
security actor and overcome the differences between its member states. Instead,
this organization might compete with other regional structures, such as the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Uzbekistan became a member in
2006 and China is not participating. The CSTO (initially: Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) could become a more important tool
since Russia and China might increase their competition for regional leadership.
In this context Moscow would play up any structures that exclude Beijing; it
already uses CSTO to increase its influence in granting preferences in arms sales
and to provide free training and education for the militaries of member states.36
It also tries to refocus NATO’s interaction with CSTO countries, turning from a
bilateral track to full cooperation between two institutions, as it had suggested in
2004 when it proposed a NATO-CSTO dialogue.37
In the long term, the prospect for SCO development looks fragile. So far, the
institution has been attractive for its members mainly because it allowed them to
preserve their status quo in Central Asia. With the changes among regional elites
and the slow but steady modernization of Central Asian societies, it will certainly
need to look for a new raison d’être or at least try to turn its existing ambitious
agenda into reality.
35 See A. Lukin (fn. 2), p. 20.
36 I. Plugatarev., Vozvrashchenie bludnogo Uzbekistana, in: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, September 15th, 2006.
37 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Karasin interview to Interfax on November 8, 2005, <http://www.mid.
ru/ns-rsng.nsf/3a813e35eb11696343 2569ee0048fdbe/43 2569d800221466c32570b3002f4f3f?OpenDocument>.
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The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Necessity
for Asian Strategic Stability
Rafeh A. Malik
Inter-state conflicts in Asia have continued to prevent peace in the region. The
balance of terror among major actors, such as India and Pakistan, and China
and her neighbors has prevented a genuine process of détente within the region,
thereby hindering arms control and economic cooperation among the Asian
states. Regional economic organizations like the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) lag behind the European Union, yet Asian states remain bigger
investors in the arms industry. They have been developing and purchasing lethal
weapons, including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
The Cold War experience has demonstrated the need for a regional institution
to manage and resolve conflict. The Asian strategic environment lacks such an
institution. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) appears to be an attractive
candidate for such a role, it lacks credibility. Theoretically speaking, ARF has
a global orientation, but its performance has been unimpressive regarding nuclear
non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, diminishing the traditional animosities
between China and her neighbors, and cementing the peace process between
India and Pakistan.
Asian security challenges require a new approach to conflict management and resolution.
A new dynamic has developed in Asia. Emerging centers of political and
economic power are forcing states to reassess national interests and prospects.
Trade opportunities and commercial ambitions foster new bilateral agreements,
and growing energy demands promote intra-regional dependencies. Strategies for
addressing issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking require cross-national
cooperation. Established, inactive regional organizations and recently formed
ones seem poised to offer more integrated approaches to common concerns.
Meanwhile, with the advent of a greater multilateral and international framework,
Western and especially American influence has receded.
Still, this transformation should not be overstated. The Asian political and economic
scene has changed. Even while an increasing interdependence among states
determines the future of many people from different nations, national sovereignties
in Asia still reign supreme and undermine regional structures. Core national
interests continue to steer foreign policies. Traditional alliances along with historic
Rafeh A. Malik
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suspicions and rivalries impede new alignments. Deeply entrenched leaders and
elites delay changes. The United States of America remains a major player in Asia
even while its quasi-unilateral international leadership has diminished.
Within this context, ASEAN has gained influence and the ARF seems to be a
viable forum for conflict resolution. Despite the importance of sovereignty as a
founding principle, any upheaval in one member state closely affects the others.
Since smaller members are more at risk than their bigger counterparts, interdependence
remains asymmetrical. The bigger states tend to enjoy a greater deal
of influence over their smaller partners. This institutional approach proves the
viability of ARF. Simultaneously, the success of ARF requires active participation
from Asian nations and other big powers. Will ARF play an important role in
enhancing Asian security? Is ARF a realistic forum for conflict management and
resolution?
The Asian Strategic Landscape
The Asian continent has experienced many rapid changes in the past decades,
including the alignment and non-alignment of states, alliances, and pacts made
and ignored by bigger partners. The United States abandoned Pakistan after the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. The emerging power of China has brought
about a shift in Indian policy and aligned her more closely with the United States.
Many now picture Asia as a breeding ground for global terrorism. For American
foreign policy, 9/11 was a watershed event originating in Asia. It led to US intervention
in Afghanistan to oust al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies, and was used
to justify the invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The US traced terrorist
attacks in East Africa and Yemen and the planning of 9/11 to southern Afghanistan.
For the last five years, Washington has viewed American and international
efforts to ensure the security and recovery of Afghanistan as indispensable to
prevent the country from again becoming a radical Islamic state hospitable to
terrorists.
Although Pakistan was an ardent supporter of the War on Terror since its very
beginning, many in Washington still doubt Pakistan’s capacity and determination
to meet her commitments. Realistically, without the active participation of Pakistan,
the future of Operation Enduring Freedom seems bleak. Untamed jihadist
organizations and tribal groups are believed to have made common cause with
al-Qaeda and aided the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The limited progress
Christopher Hill, The Foreign Politics of Foreign Policy, New York, NY, 2003, p. 176.
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made in reforming madressah education evidences Pakistan’s role as a breeding
ground for extremists. Iran has been accused of sponsoring terrorism through its
support of militant movements in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon.
Similarly, many believe that Bashar’s Syria aids radical groups.
Political rivalry among powers in East Asia has become quite intense. The United
States, Japan, China and Russia have divergent security and defense objectives
and goals. Japan and the United States do not share similar goals for East Asia
either. Japan’s territorial claims and disputes with South Korea regarding the Takashima
islands, and with Russia regarding the Kuriles islands put it in a different
mind set than the US. Japan plays mostly an economic role. Her political, defense,
and strategic actions are much weaker than that of the US. In addition, Taiwan
further complicates Sino-US relations.
The Korean peninsula remains divided since the outbreak of the Korean War
(1951–53), and continues to reflect the atmosphere of the Cold War. The two
Koreas, Japan, the United States, Russia and China are still struggling to achieve
their respective goals in Northeast Asia and to make security arrangements in
Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region.
In reality, ASEAN countries do not want to have to choose between the United
States, Russia and China. They want to involve all the great powers in regional
Rafeh Malik from Pakistan
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interdependencies and institutions in order to promote moderation on the part
of the big actors. However, China took a leadership role in the ASEAN Regional
Forum, and both Russia and China have become more assertive and less deferential
to Washington, forming new political and economic alignments. Both
are particularly anxious to keep the US from maintaining too much leverage in
Asia, especially in their traditional spheres of influence. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) has emerged as a challenger to the United States.
Formed as an anti-terrorist organization that included all of the Central Asian
Islamic states except for Turkmenistan, the SCO has evolved into a political and
economic agenda that favors the gradual withdrawal of American forces from
the region. Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia and India have observer status in the SCO.
Other regional groupings have seen some revitalization, such as SAARC and the
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Their meetings have stressed the
importance of confidence building and economic growth. States have joined in
new bilateral agreements, though most projects remain unfulfilled. Moreover, despite
their common ground on many issues, most regimes in the region hold on
to their suspicions of one another.
Horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation has become another significant
development in the current strategic environment of the region. Although the
international community acknowledges India and Pakistan as de facto members
of the nuclear club, it remains apprehensive since these two states continue to
act as bitter adversaries, conceivably embarking on an arms race. In 1999 during
the Kargil crisis and again in the military buildup of 2001/2002, New Delhi and
Islamabad were heading towards nuclear war. Fortunately, reason prevailed on
both sides and they were able to control the escalation of the crisis. The nuclear
conflict between India and Pakistan has had a destabilizing impact on the entire
world economy because both states lie on the Indian Ocean. A military showdown
between them in the Arabian Sea or in other adjacent areas would severely
affect the safety of sea passage from the Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman) and the
Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). Peace and the free flow of trade through
the Indian Ocean are not only in the interest of coastal and hinterland states in
the region, but also in the interest of the entire world.
By 2006, the booming narcotics trade in Afghanistan produced over ninety percent
of the world’s supply of heroin. Although the US is not the prime market
Winberg Chai, The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of China’s World Views: From Marxist-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-
Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, in: Asian Affairs an American Review, No. 3/2003, p. 169.
See the article by Natalia Touzovskaia in this book.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Nuclear Capable Navies of India and Pakistan: Impact on the Strategic Environment of the
Indian Ocean, in: IPRI Journal (Islamabad), No. 1/2004.
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for Afghanistan’s heroin, it shares a deep concern about the flourishing drug
trade with Europe and other states in the region. Washington and other capitals
have started to feel the corrosive societal effects of these exports, and its corrupting
influence has had a detrimental effect on the governance of Afghanistan.
The likelihood that drug trafficking also fuels the country’s mounting insurgency
has intensified the dedication on the part of the US to disable the heroin market.
To date, the US has spent over $750 million a year in what has so far been a losing
battle to bring the drug trade under control. International efforts to eradicate
the poppy crop have been counter-productive since they have alienated large
sections of the rural population and allowed the Taliban to reassume their role as
the protector of farmers, whose livelihood relies on the stable market for poppies.
The preceding discussion proves that strategic competition as well as inter- and
intra-state conflicts have not only been holding Asia back, but could potentially
have disastrous consequences for the entire world. Optimism for the development
of the Asian community requires that their leadership sufficiently resolve
these puzzles so that Asia’s future will not resemble her past. Instead of sliding
into anarchy or falling back into pre-Westphalian hierarchy, Asia has the potential
to manage its insecurity and ensure its prosperity through shared regional norms,
rising economic interdependencies, and growing institutional partnerships. Improved
performance of associations like SAARC and ASEAN certainly enhance
the economic interdependency and generate trust among member states. This
would help replace enmity with amity between Asian states.
The strengthened economies in Asia and the global competition for energy
resources have added a new dimension to international relations. Washington’s
policies have been forced to accommodate an increasingly economically powerful
China as well as India’s fast growing, diversifying economy. American policy has
tried to balance criticism of China’s trade and human rights policies with economic
motivation because of the US’s extensive commercial relations and China’s
huge dollar accounts. US foreign policy decisions in the Middle East remain
devoted to insuring secure sources of oil and to defending friendly oil-producing
countries. China’s rapidly expanding economy puts it in even greater competition
with the US for future oil and gas reserves. Since abandoning important sectors
of its formerly static economy, India has enhanced its own economic opportunities
and prompted rapidly expanding strategic partnerships. Russia has also
emerged as a competitor for the Asian energy market in the development and
distribution of resources.
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While the US has usually been satisfied to conduct state-to-state relations, public
attitudes towards American policies and policy makers have become increasingly
unfavorable. Washington has expressed concern about the broad and deep
antipathy toward American policies that has spread throughout the Asian public.
Though a little less in India and Japan, surveys have generally shown a visible gap
between the opinion of the ruling elites and the general population. Washington
has gradually come to recognize the mounting constraints on its governmental
policy makers. Even if no long-term allies have broken with the US, national
leaders have been motivated to raise the price of their cooperation with the US.
But rather than reexamining its policies, Washington has for the most part viewed
this issue as a public relations challenge, and still seeks to win a better hearing for
American foreign policy.
In terms of strategic stability, members of ASEAN have constructed a durable
security regime, the ARF that has allowed them to solve and demilitarize a variety
of disputes between them. Based on the ASEAN experience, the ARF contends
that sustainable dialogue can produce measurable improvements in political
relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional
security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security
in the region. The ARF is characterized by consensus-based decision-making and
minimal institutionalization.
The ARF: A Forum for Strategic Dialogue
The participants of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial
Conference, held in Singapore on July 23rd–25th, 1993, agreed to establish the
ASEAN Regional Forum. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok
on July 25th, 1994. In 1994, the first ARF meeting brought together foreign ministers
from Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic
of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam. The ARF draws
together 23 countries, which influence the security of the Asia Pacific Region. It is
comprised of the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the ten
ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN observer
(Papua New Guinea), as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK), Mongolia and Pakistan. East Timor was admitted to the ARF in 2005.
Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, Rethinking East Asian Security, in: Survival, No. 2/1994, p. 11.
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In a region with little history of security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional
Forum has become the main forum for conducting security dialogue in Asia. The
ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues, which underpin
the region’s security architecture. It fosters constructive dialogue and consultation
on political and social issues of common interest, and makes significant contributions
to confidence-building measures. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a
three-stage evolutionary approach to the development of the ARF, moving from
confidence building to preventive diplomacy and towards conflict resolution
capability in the long term.
In its first ten years, the ARF has made modest gains in building a sense of
strategic community. More recently, it has contributed to the region’s counter-terrorism
work. However, efforts to develop tools of preventive diplomacy and
conflict management are still at an early stage. While the ARF continues to focus
on confidence-building measures, its members have also agreed that preventive
diplomacy should proceed parallel to these efforts, particularly in areas where
these two initiatives overlap.
As a preventive diplomacy tool, ARF members have also agreed to enhance the
role of the ARF chair in coordinating ARF positions to strengthen the organi-
ARF (Second ARF Ministerial Meeting), A Concept Paper, 18 March 1995, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/statements/
arf2conc.html>.
Bob Deen shares his work experience from Central Asia
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zation’s ability to respond to situations affecting the security of ARF members
during the period between Ministerial meetings. Another mechanism is an ARF
Register of Experts and Eminent Persons, which, when operational, will provide
a pool of expertise on regional security issues that may be useful for the ARF
chair or individual ARF members.
Recommendations for the Success of the ARF
The ARF’s role in promoting Asian strategic stability could be significant if a
number of issues are taken into account. The resolution of the following matters
would improve ARF’s effectiveness and enhance its credibility in both the Asian
strategic environment and world politics in general. A successful ARF requires
the active participation and cooperation of all participants. ASEAN must always
be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants.
The defense ministers of ARF member countries should hold regular meetings
aimed at encouraging dialogue for peace and security in the region by discussing
various problems including defense policies, arms control, and disarmament.
ARF member countries should create a cooperative system for the exchange of
information concerning drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. Although
member states agreed to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism at an ARF
meeting on July 30th, 2002, there remains a lack of realistic bilateral or multilateral
steps for curbing these menaces.
Periods of rapid growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power relations.
This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to manage these transitions
carefully to preserve peace. ARF should recognize and accept different approaches
to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues.
The region experiences residual tension with regards to unresolved territorial
and other matters of contention. Any of these could spark a conflagration that
could undermine peace and prosperity in the region. Over time ARF will have to
temper these potential problems.
The ARF should tackle these challenges through a gradual approach using confidence-
building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms.
In promoting confidence building, the ARF may adopt two approaches.
The first approach derives from the experience of ASEAN, which provides
East Asian Strategic Review 2003 (The National Institute for Defense Studies), Tokyo, June 2003, p. 223.
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the ARF with a valuable guide that has proven its own capabilities. ASEAN has
succeeded in reducing tensions among its member states, promoting regional
cooperation, and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity.
The second approach will be to implement the above-mentioned measures, which
ARF participants can explore and implement in the immediate future, and also
make proposals, which they can employ in the long term. These models could
also aid the Track Two Process in the immediate future.
The ARF must develop its own mechanism to practice preventive diplomacy and
conflict resolution. In doing so, the ARF will face quite a lot of challenges. There
are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of
confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to establish
mechanisms perceived to be intrusive or autonomous. This is a political reality
that the ARF should recognize. However, it would be useful in the initial phase
of the Track Two Process to consider and investigate a variety of preventive
diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms. This preventive diplomacy would
follow confidence-building measures. Conflict resolution should be an eventual
goal that ARF participants must pursue as they begin to develop the ARF as a
vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.
Conclusion
ARF participants assume that the ARF will be a success. But the experiences of
regional organizations like ASEAN show that success results from hard work
and careful adherence to the rule of consensus. ARF participants will have to
work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays
on track. Moreover, a great deal of innovation and ingenuity will be required to
keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensuring the support of
its diverse participants. This is a major challenge for the ASEAN countries and
other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General’s “Agenda for Peace” has
recognized that “just as no two regions are the same, so the design of cooperative
work and its division of labor must adjust to the realities of each case with
flexibility and creativity.”
General Secretary of the UN, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,
A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>, here: paragraph #62.
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The International Forum on Strategic Thinking at its best – socializing, networking and making
friends
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in the Middle East
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Regional Security in the Middle East: Cooperation between
Multinational and Regional Actors?
Mohamed Ibrahim
Since the second Gulf War and the peace process between Arab countries and Israel
in 1991, regional dynamics in the Middle East have shaken the security of the
region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli-Syrian conflict, as well as the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have had direct impact
on the regional security of the Middle East. Furthermore, after the terror attacks
in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, global terrorism has been
perceived as the main threat to the Western World. The United States as well as
the European Union declared that the biggest threat came from the Middle East.
To fight this threat, European and US politicians emphasized the need for democratization
and reforms in the Middle East. They contended that the implementation
of these reforms would bring about regional security. But why regional
security in the Middle East still has not become a reality? This paper makes the
assumption that regional security will only be achieved by solving the Israeli-Arab
conflict since this issue has the most imminent impact on regional security in the
Middle East. Another assumption is that the Israeli-Arab conflict can be solved
through intensive cooperation between multinational and regional actors. The
Israeli-Arab conflict will only be solved when peace between Israel and the Palestinians
is realized. This paper will discuss new regional dynamics since the second
Gulf War, its implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as different
multinational and regional initiatives and the reasons for their failure. It further
suggests that the chance for a lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis has
a much greater chance if multinational actors cooperate with a potential regional
power like Turkey. Such a peace agreement would promote stability in the Middle
East.
Regional Dynamics since the Second Gulf War and their Effects
on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The peace process in the mid-1990s has changed the political and economic
relationship of Arab countries with Israel. Before the Oslo Agreement in 1993,
Egypt was the only Arab nation maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.
Since it signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 in Camp David, it was consequently
excluded from the Arab League. Although the Oslo Agreement justi-
Cf. Anthony H. Cordesman. Iraq and “After”: Rethinking the Major Policy Issues in the Wider Middle East (Center for
Strategic and International Studies – CSIS), Washington, DC, 6.7.2004, p. 21.
Mohamed Ibrahim 
Roadmap:
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After the Roadmap
fied official diplomatic relations between Arab countries and Israel, the escalating
Israeli-Palestinian conflict still has direct implications on Arab-Israeli cooperation.
No other conflict has bothered the Arab League more than the Israeli-Palestinian
one. The final agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is in principle accepted
by both parties: a two state solution, evacuation of most Israeli settlements in the
West Bank, Jerusalem as the capital for both sides, and limited return of Palestinian
refugees to Israel. The Palestinian government under Hamas implicitly accepts
the idea of a two state solution by offering Israel a long-term cease-fire in
exchange for the implementation of the above-mentioned conditions.
The Oslo Agreement:
The first official dialogue between Arab countries and Israel took place at the
Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. This conference paved the way for direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, which then led to the Oslo Agreement
in 1993. The Oslo Agreement stated that final status negotiations should
start after a five-year period. Unfortunately, the conflict escalated in the mid-90s
and the Oslo Agreement failed. Israel expanded its settlements, which the Palestinians
considered and continue to consider a major obstacle for a potential
Palestinian state. Israel, on the other hand, was still waiting for the security it was
claiming. In addition to these major factors, the negotiations between the Palestinians
and Israelis were conducted without any US or EU engagement. The
failure of the Oslo Agreement lies in the fact that multinational and regional
actors did not accompany the conflicting parties during the implementation
phase. Although the international community provided intensive development aid
to the Palestinians, the important issues that affected the daily life of the people
were postponed for the final status agreement. Multinational actors should have
accompanied the conflicting parties on the ground, e. g. the inclusion of multinational
observers within the joint Israeli-Palestinian security controls, in order to
ensure that both parties complied with the agreed agenda. Without external help,
a peace agreement between the two parties lies out of reach.
“Hamas Officials Already Recognize Israel’s Right to Exist, Apparently”: Prime Minister Ismail Haniya: “If Israel withdraws
to the 1967 borders, peace will prevail and we will implement a cease-fire [hudna] for many years.” Published in:
News Center (CommonDreams.org), May 31st, 2006, <http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0531-23.htm>.
Jordan (the Palestinians were part of the Jordanian delegation), Lebanon, Syria.
A German version of its text in: Angelika Volle / Werner Weidenfeld (Hrsg.), Frieden im Nahen Osten? Chancen, Gefahren,
Perspektiven. Beiträge und Dokumente aus Europa-Archiv und Internationale Politik, Bonn 1997, pp. 168–176.
These issues included Israeli settlements, the city of Jerusalem, regional borders, Palestinian refugees, and access to
water.
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Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in
Barcelona in 1995 only two years after the Oslo Agreement, marked the starting
point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide
framework for political, economic and social relations between the member states
of the EU and partners of the southern Mediterranean. The agreement aimed
at establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010 and at creating a
region of peace, security and prosperity. Through the Barcelona Process, Europe
seeks to promote democracy, political reforms and regional co-operation in the
partner countries of the EMP. Most governments in the Middle East, however,
oppose these explicit goals. Thus, the efforts of the EU to promote political
reforms have become incompatible with the policy of Arab governments, which
seem willing to accept only reforms that do not question their authority. The Israeli-
Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular are not a stated
priority of the Barcelona Process. It was not the explicit aim of the Barcelona
Process to focus on or solve the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand, the
Barcelona Process had and still has direct implications on the Israeli-Arab conflict
and therefore deserves attention. Due to a growing number of Jewish settlements
The group of nations included Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon,
Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.
Cf. Muriel Asseburg, Die transatlantische Debatte über den »Broader Middle East« und die Erfahrungen des Barcelona
Prozesses, Discussion Paper during the 12th SWP dialogue, October 12, 2004, p. 4.
Mohamed Ibrahim during his presentation on regional security in the Middle East, with Hans
Bastian Hauck
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After the Roadmap
in the West Bank, the Arab League called for a boycott of Arab-Israeli relations
at the European-Mediterranean Conference that took place in Malta in 1997.
Furthermore, the Second Intifada in 2000 had a negative impact on the Barcelona
Process.
The Roadmap
In April 2003 the Middle East Quartet presented its “Roadmap” to the Palestinian
Authority and Israel, an initiative that should have led to a two state solution
by 2005. Both conflicting parties had reservations and tried to push their own
initiatives through, without any significant success. The plan consists of three
phases. In the first phase the Palestinians shall declare a cease-fire as well as
acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority must
disarm Palestinian groups and proceed with political reforms. Israel is to stop the
expansion of settlements, evacuate those settlements built after March 2001 and
withdraw its military forces from areas populated by Palestinians. The second
phase is meant to start with Palestinian elections, an international conference, and
the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state. The third phase would then
deal with all unsolved questions, e. g. regional borders, Jerusalem, the settlements
as well as Palestinian refugees. The weakness of the Roadmap is obvious. Like
the Oslo Agreement, the most important issues would be negotiated only at the
end of the process. The agreement is not described in detail and only refers to
well-known documents such as United Nations Resolutions 242 and 33 8. Multinational
actors’ involvement in the Roadmap process is limited to observing its
development on the international level. Even though an important instrument,
international monitoring is not sufficient. The Roadmap is based on voluntary
participation of the conflicting parties. Any means of international pressure or
sanctions would constitute a breach of the agreement.
One of the main obstacles for the Roadmap to succeed is the fact that the conflicting
parties have not been involved in the drafting process. The most important
issues, such as Israel’s security concerns, are not satisfactorily met in the
agreement. On the other hand, Israel expected the Palestinians to give up their
right of return. The failure of this initiative was inevitable.
USA, EU, Russia, UN.
The UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied
in the recent conflict; cf. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.
pdf ?OpenElement>. The UN Security Council Resolution 33 8 calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately
after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.
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The New Middle East after September 11, 2001
Immediately after the terror attacks in the USA, the Bush administration accused
non-democratic countries of promoting terror and therefore endangering
the Western World. In order to fight this terror, the administration attempted to
use military force coupled with political reforms. From this perspective, the war
against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the war against Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq was meant to produce regional security in the Middle East. With
the “Forward Strategy for Freedom”10 authoritarian regimes should be “guided”
in the process of liberalization and democratization. After controversial negotiations
between the US government and the EU concerning the use of military
force, the US government modified its plan for a “Greater Middle East.” Any
subsequent modifications could not hide the weakness of the plan. The Greater
Middle East Initiative was created by the US government and later modified by
the EU, but the countries of the Middle East were not included in the negotiations.
Therefore, yet another initiative was bound to fail.
Both the EMP as well as the Greater Middle East Initiative do not mention the
Israeli-Arab conflict as a priority. However, the Greater Middle East Initiative had
and still has direct implications on the regional security of the Middle East. Kuwait
was the only Arab country which officially supported the regime change in
Iraq. The smaller countries of the Gulf as well as Jordan indirectly supported the
war led by the US. These countries are becoming increasingly important for geopolitical
strategy, especially that of the United States. The countries of the Gulf
as well as Israel gained more importance in the Middle East after the war. The
Israeli fear of being attacked from the East has been unfounded since the war
against Iraq. Since the war, countries like Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost
political power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been accused of promoting
terror, mainly by the US. Almost all assassins of the 9/11 attacks were Saudi
Arabian citizens. Saudi Arabia is currently trying to get back its former standing
towards the West but still suffers from the accusations of the West. Egypt has
strongly opposed the attempts the US has made to promote reform in the region.
While Egypt wants to sustain its support of the US with regard to the war against
terror, it is fighting terror in its own country and fears that the enactment of
political reforms would incite Islamic terrorism, which would lead to an unstable
situation in Egypt and the whole region. The September 11 terror attacks have
posed great challenges to regional security in the Middle East.
10 Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a “Forward Strategy of Freedom” to Promote Democracy in the Middle East,
The White House, Washington, DC, 26.11.2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-
11.html>.
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As stated above, the Israeli-Arab conflict was not a priority for the “Greater
Middle East Initiative.” But the US government contended that the implementation
of this initiative would resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. This assumption
seems unrealistic since both the Greater Middle East Initiative as well as the EMP
appear to Middle Eastern nations as a Western attempt to gain more influence
in the region. Unless the desired reforms come from within the region itself, the
“Greater Middle East Initiative” will fail.
Potential Regional Actors in the Middle East
Since the above-mentioned multinational initiatives failed in their attempts to
provide regional security in the Middle East, the search for other approaches is
pressing. One proposed solution is to include at least one regional actor in the
Middle East in the development of future initiatives. Turkey is such a potential
regional power.
Turkey as a potential regional actor in the Israeli-Arab conflict
The end of the Cold World War in 1989 decreased Turkey’s geopolitical importance
in the Middle East. NATO was in the process of closing military bases
when suddenly the second Gulf War paved the way for Turkey’s new role in the
Middle East:
· military bases serving the war in Iraq;
· political and economic bridge to ethnic Turks in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan;
· stronghold against Islamic fundamentalism;
· means of accessing oil and natural resources at the Caspian Sea.
Due to this new understanding, NATO as well as the EU describe Turkey as an
important ally. Turkey’s interests in the region are compatible with those of the
international powers and have led to increased cooperation with Turkey. The terror
attacks of September 11th brought international powers closer to Turkey. The
new Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East became clear when Turkey stood
on the allies’ side during and after the second Gulf War. Turkey also intensified
its cooperation with Israel during the mid 90s. In 1996, both countries signed a
military agreement. Despite this close cooperation, Turkey also has close political
and economic ties with its Arab neighbors. Due to its cultural and religious roots,
Turkey is part of the Islamic world. But in regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict,
Turkey is the only regional power which maintains a close relationship with both
conflicting parties.
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This paper assumes that regional security is possible by solving the Israeli-Arab
conflict through the implementation of a long lasting peace agreement between
Palestinians and Israelis. Multinational and regional powers must work together
to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As stated above, Palestinians and Israelis
have in principle accepted the framework of a final status agreement. It is now
time for negotiations between a multinational actor, like the Middle East Quartet,
the conflicting parties and a regional power like Turkey. The Arab Summit in
Beirut in 2002 made an extensive offer for a long lasting peace between all Arab
countries and Israel. It called for all Arab countries to sign an immediate peace
agreement with Israel, acknowledging Israel’s right to exist. Israel would have to
withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 and a Palestinian state would be
established. There are two main reasons why Israel ignored this offer. First of all,
Israel did not trust the Beirut offer of the Arab League. Second, this offer did
not meet Israel’s security interests. Due to Turkey’s good relations with Israel, its
role as a regional power can actively contribute to Israel’s security when it comes
to a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Turkey can become a
bridge-builder in the region since it enjoys trust on both conflicting sides. However,
Turkey’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be envisioned within a
broader US and EU involvement. Due to the US-Israeli relationship, Israel may
only accept a peace agreement that would include the US. On the other hand,
NATO cannot serve as a multinational power in a Middle East peace initiative
since the Arab world considers NATO to be a purely western institution. The sit-
Israeli-Palestinian encounter and dialogue during the NFC
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After the Roadmap
uation in Afghanistan demonstrates this perception. If Turkey became a member
of the EU, it could not maintain its role as a regional power with good relations
to both conflicting parties. Other regional actors would question Turkey’s role as
a regional power, since the country would be perceived as part of the West. It is
also important to mention that thus far no common EU foreign policy towards
the region exists. This does not only apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As
long as peace agreements do not result from cooperation between multinational
actors and regional powers, security in the region will be difficult to realize.
This paper shows that one of the most important reasons for the failure of
achieving regional security in the Middle East was the mistrust among conflicting
parties. Turkey as a Muslim country with good diplomatic ties with the western
world in general and Israel in particular could contribute to sustainable regional
security in the Middle East. Turkey should not only mediate between Palestinians
and Israelis. Turkey is the only regional power in the Middle East which could
also give Israel the confidence that her security would not be endangered in case
of a peace accord.
Karim Makdisi with emotional statements from Beirut, just weeks after the 2nd Israel-Lebanon War
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Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
The Emerging EU Alternative
Stuart Reigeluth
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires the international intervention of a third
party. The multinational force deployed to southern Lebanon is viewed as a possible
precedent for international intervention in the Gaza Strip. A parallel could
be drawn between the “Lebanon model” and the creation of a security buffer
between Israel and the Palestinians, but the circumstances on the ground in
southern Lebanon are different from those in the Palestinian territories. Since the
“question of Palestine” remains pivotal to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the deployment of an international force to the Palestinian territories should
therefore not be contingent upon the outcome of the UN/multinational force in
southern Lebanon. The EU offers the best alternative for third party intervention
in the Palestinian territories. Though the risks are high for the credibility of the
EU, the launching of an initial military mission, a “Battle Group” of 1,500–2,000
troops, could bring about the cessation of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities, thus providing
security for Israel and stability for the Palestinians.
Third Party Context
The Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia) Roadmap has been derailed and bilateral negotiations
suspended. The democratic recognition for armed resistance acquired by
the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has not facilitated dialogue with Israel.
Consequently, the international financial embargo and Israeli military operations
remain in effect. After the 2006 Lebanon War, international analysts agreed that
Israel waged the war to restore a degree of military deterrence on its northern
front. The same desire for deterrence against the launching of Palestinian “Qassam”
missiles applies to the repeated Israeli operations against the Gaza Strip. As
a result of the Lebanon War, the deployment of a multinational force reinforces
the UNIFIL mandate and ability to create a security buffer in southern Lebanon.
In the Palestinian territories, Ehud Olmert’s “convergence” plan – unilateral withdrawal
– is being seriously reconsidered. A synchronized Israeli withdrawal with a
similar third party “security buffer” deployment in the Palestinian territories could
become a possibility. Similar to Hizballah in southern Lebanon, once the resis-
In reference to the 2006 Lebanon War, Robert Malley claims that the 2006 Lebanon War was a “war waged to reassert
Israel’s power of deterrence,” and simultaneously that “greater international attention will mean more intense international
involvement.” See Malley, A New Middle East, in: New York Review of Books, September 21, 2006. Muriel
Asseburg agrees that the 2006 Lebanon War was carried out with the goal of “re-establishing an effective deterrent.”
See Asseburg, An International Force for Lebanon?, Comments 20 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP, Berlin),
August 2006.
Stuart Reigeluth
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tance rationale is resolved, Hamas will have no incentive to maintain an armed
militia or to become part of a unified Palestinian security force. As international
momentum grows, now is an opportune time for third party intervention.
Third party intervention is not a new concept. Martin Indyk proposed a US-led
third party in the Palestinian territories. Following the Israeli disengagement
from the Gaza Strip in August/September 2005, the EU deployed a civilian
mission, EU BAM-Rafah, to monitor the passage of goods and people through
the Rafah Crossing Point. Other clauses have yet to be fulfilled as part of the
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) signed by Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (PA). During the international deployment to southern Lebanon, PA
President Mahmoud Abbas called for the intervention of an international body
resembling the one in Lebanon. Abbas also stated that this international force
would be in agreement with the emergence of a coalition Palestinian government.
Though historically adverse to third party intervention, Israel has been increasingly
receptive to the involvement of a multinational force, as demonstrated
in southern Lebanon. According to Yossi Alpher, this new receptiveness is due to
the failure of the “traditional solutions, both military (conquest and occupation)
and diplomatic (bilateral peace processes),” and could be seen as a positive step
towards resolving the conflict with the Palestinians.
The EU Alternative
Considering that the US is embroiled in Iraq and NATO is entangled in Afghanistan,
the Palestinians would perceive neither authority as impartial. Both would
appear as a threat to Arab/Muslim regimes such as Syria and Iran, and would be
equally targeted by militant Islamist groups. The other option would be a multinational
force sponsored by the UN flag, but the legitimacy of the UN has been
severely eroded since the 2003 Iraq War. The international inability to enforce
UN Security Council Resolutions has been most perceptible with respect to Israel.
The unilateral US veto to halt hostilities in the Gaza Strip as well as the postpone-
With the support of France and Italy, Spain initiated a call for a European peace plan for the Middle East, which
would include five points demarcated by Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, including the deployment
of international observers and / or a military mission to the Gaza Strip. See Peru Egurbide, España, Francia e Italia
impulsan un plan europeo de paz para Oriente Medio, in: El País, November 17, 2006; Zapatero propone, Opinión,
in: El País, November 17, 2006; and, Europe in Middle East Push, Al-Jazeera.net, November 17, 2006.
Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, in: Foreign Affairs, May–June 2003, pp. 51–66.
Yoav Stern, Abbas Calls for International Force in PA as Part of New Government Plan, in: Haaretz, August 31st,
2006; Yoav Stern, PA Unity Government Could Ask for International Force, in: Haaretz, September 1st, 2006.
Yossi Alpher, Toward Trusteeship?, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 18, 2006, über:
<http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
The public intentions of deploying European Member State soldiers to southern Lebanon to provide security for Israel,
as proclaimed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, arose much controversy and instigated angry Lebanese
responses. See Lebanon’s Top Shi’ite Cleric: UN Force only Protects Israel, in: Haaretz, October 16, 2006.
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ment of a prompt diplomatic resolution to the 2006 Lebanon War further eroded
the legitimacy of the UN. The UN/multinational force in southern Lebanon
should therefore not be replicated in the Palestinian territories. For lack of a better
option, the EU now presents the best alternative for third party intervention
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Due to geographic proximity and common security, the Middle East has become
the most important region for EU foreign policy. The 2006 Lebanon War caused
a sudden and fundamental change in the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP). Joschka Fischer considers that an initiative to deploy militarily in the
Middle East lies in the interest of EU Member States. The current dilemma is
that the EU does not have an effectively unified common foreign policy and its
actions remain determined by national interests, as demonstrated by the deployment
of national contingencies under the UN flag. Though France initiated the
deployment to southern Lebanon and transferred the leadership to Italy, incremental
synergies should be encouraged between Member State contingencies
rather than representative competition.10
Spain and Italy present such symbolic competition. In the wake of the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Socialist Party (PSOE) ascended to power in Spain,
and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero rapidly withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq.
Romano Prodi, recently gaining electoral recognition for the Italian Socialist Party,
has also called for an imminent withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq. Ironically,
both EU Member States may be at as great a risk by legally deploying in southern
Lebanon, just as they were when they deployed illegally in Iraq. Referring to
UNSC Resolution 1701, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number-two of al-Qaeda, stated
“the international peacekeeping force now deploying in southern Lebanon are
‘enemies of Islam.’”11 As France steps down from its colonial legacy in Lebanon,
both Spain and Italy are asserting themselves in acting as peace-keepers/-makers
in southern Lebanon. Both EU member states also play large roles in the two
EU civilian missions (EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah) in the Palestinian
territories.
Echoing the Palestinian demand for a replication of the international force in
southern Lebanon, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema called for the
See Richard Falk, The UN After Lebanon, in: The Nation, October 2nd, 2006.
Joschka Fischer, Europa cruza el Rubicón, in: El País, September 5, 2006, p. 13.
See Denis MacShane, Europe is Involved in Palestine, But not Coherently, in: The Daily Star, November 14, 2006.
10 La première fois, l’Europe peut jouer un rôle actif au Proche-Orient, in: Le Monde, August 25, 2006.
11 Richard Beeston, Al-Qaeda Threatens New Terror Offensive against Gulf States, in: The Times, September 12, 2006.
UNIFIL II forces will not be targeted by Hezbollah but rather by extremist Sunni Muslim groups. See Robert Fisk,
Conflict in Middle East is Mission Implausible, in: The Independent, November 15, 2006.
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deployment of an international force in the Gaza Strip.12 A proper EU approach
should now be based on the common interest for security in coordination with
the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (currently Marc
Otte) via EU Council High Representative, Javier Solana. Member States could
contribute national contingencies to EU “Battle Groups” rather than contingencies
beneath the UN flag. The difference is subtle, but important: instead of
promulgating a national Member State force, each individual member state could
contribute to a common EU effort. The EU can use this as an opportunity to
develop a “coherent foreign policy toward the Middle East” based on a common
defense and security policy, repudiating the power politics of military force, and
defined by multilateral consent between engaging parties.13
Instead of an UN / multinational force led by one member state (as in southern
Lebanon), the EU now has the capability to deploy a “Battle Group” of 1,500-
2,000 soldiers. This may not be sufficient to secure the Gaza-Israel border and
certainly not the West Bank. However, an initial Battle Group could be reinforced
by subsequent Battle Groups once the EU has the capability to deploy over ten
such groups with the operational ability “to undertake two simultaneous missions.”
14 The deployment of a Battle Group would also revamp the EU civilian
missions operating in the Palestinian territories. Subsequently, the EU monitoring
role at Rafah Crossing Point could expand to include monitoring the other crossing
points along the Gaza-Israel border, as well as along the Jordan-Palestine border.
Simultaneously, EUPOL-COPPS could reinitiate the training of a Palestinian
Civil Police force. This may be opposed by Israel because it may eventually lead
to the formation of a Palestinian National Army. However, Israel could accept
the emergence of a Palestinian National Army if the “burden of responsibility”
were transferred to the surveillance and guidance of an international third party
force.15 Mentioning the emergence of a Palestinian National Army seems nonetheless
premature if the Palestinians do not have a nation. International intervention
must therefore be conditioned on mutual bilateral political commitment
based on the parameters for a final settlement between Israel and the PA.
12 Meron Rapoport, Italian FM: Harsh U.S. Approach to Mideast Failed, in: Haaretz, August 25, 2006.
13 See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, A European Force: What For?, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – Instituto de Estudos
Estratégicos e Internacionais, Berlin / Lissabon 2006. Alvaro de Vasconcelos argues that the successful emergence of a
common EU foreign policy will depend on “whether the force emanates from Europe’s defence policy or whether it is
the result of a coalition led by one member state.”
14 See The EU Battle Groups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell (European Union Fact Sheet), February, 2005; “Battle
Groups” to strengthen EU military crisis management?, in: European Security Review (ISIS Europe), April 2004;
Markus Kaim, EU Battle Groups and Civilian Headline Goal – ESDP Targets, in: Volker Perthes / Stefan Mair (eds.),
European Foreign and Security Policy, Challenges and Opportunities for the German EU Presidency (SWP Research
Papers; RP 10/2006), Berlin, October 2006, pp. 19–22.
15 Israel’s Political Options Vis-à-vis the Palestinians (Reut Institute, Tel Aviv), November 16, 2006, p. 7.
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Political Commitment
European military engagement should be accompanied by political commitment.
To reinforce the multinational military presence, the EU may take certain political
initiatives:
1) Act as an impartial third party mediator, assist in the consolidation of a
coalition PA government, including elements of the democratically elected
Hamas and remnants of Fatah.
2) Push for Palestinian acquiescence to the three conditions demanded by
Israel: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and acceptance to
previous agreements between the PA and Israel; on the condition that Israel
also respect the previous agreements, namely the Paris Protocol (1994) and
the Agreement on Movement and Access (2005).
3) Create confidence between the PA and the Government of Israel. The EU
Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (Marc Otte) would
willingly act as intermediary between the conflicting parties.
4) Expand the sectors of implementation for foreign funds via the Temporary
International Mechanism (TIM) to include schools and universities, hospitals
and clinics, companies and clients.
5) Exert diplomatic pressure on Israel to return the monthly tax and customs
revenues to the PA as stipulated by the 1994 Paris Protocol within the Oslo
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Accord framework, and offer the reward of shifting the security burden of
responsibility to the EU Battle Groups.
6) Ensure a two-state solution via a long-term 15–20 year hudna, or “truce,”
between the Palestinians and Israelis based on the pre-1967 borders (or the
1948 armistice line). The “convergence” plan is not set in stone. Small “outposts”
can be incorporated within larger settlements, but these larger Jewish
settlements can also be relocated within Israel proper (inside the demarcation
line of 1948, prior to 1967), as a majority resides on Palestinian-owned
land, or they could be swapped “for some equivalent territories in presentday
Israel.”16
Going for Gaza First?
The first and most attractive option for Israel is that an international force deploy
in Gaza. There are preliminary advantages for Israel, the Palestinians, and the
European Union:
1) Increase Israeli security in cities around the Gaza Strip, namely Ashdod,
Askelon and Sderot. However, Israel must comprehend that eradicating the
launching of “Qassam” rockets will not occur instantaneously, but that given
time and space to maneuver, a multinational force could gradually reduce the
number of missiles launched into Israel to zero. “Qassams” have generally
had little impact on Israeli society or infrastructure, and have been employed
by Israel as a reason to retaliate with excessive force. An international deployment
could thus help demonstrate that “Qassam” missiles are counterproductive
to Palestinian national aspirations and daily economic interests.
2) Provide security in the streets of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians must understand
the need to ease the explosive frictions between opposing factions.
An international force could provide calm by patrolling the streets of Gaza
City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. Given enough credibility, this
multinational force would provide the Palestinian National Unity Government
the breathing space needed to operate effectively, which Hamas has
repeatedly claimed is also in its interest. In cooperation with the coalition
PA government, the Palestinian security forces should include the emerging
Presidential Guard (Fatah) and the Executive Force (Hamas) as well as incorporate
militant wings of respective groups, such as the most prominent two:
the Izz al-Din al-Qassam (Hamas) and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah). The
deployment of an international EU force should also be based on the condition
that militias would be incorporated within a unified Palestinian civil po-
16 See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Maps says West Bank Posts Sit on Arab Land, in: The New York Times, November 21,
2006; Henry Kissinger, What’s Needed From Hamas, in: The Washington Post, February 27, 2006.
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lice force, which could lead to the emergence of a unified Palestinian armed
force (similar to the multi-ethnic Lebanese Army) which would eventually
replace the function of the international force in patrolling the streets of the
Gaza Strip and the Gaza-Israel border (as well as the Gaza-Egypt border).
3) Enhance the visibility and effectiveness of the EU presence. The deployment
of a multinational force could provide the security mentioned and thus
permit the full implementation of the two EU civilian missions operating in
the Palestinian territories: EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah. Both civilian
missions are currently suspended due to circumstances on the ground,
but could easily be reinvigorated with adequate security measures in coordination
with Israel and the Palestinians. The renewal of full implementation
would permit the passage of people and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip,
thus assisting economic development. The creation of jobs and the general
rejuvenation of the economy would decrease the incentive for individuals to
carry out radical acts of violence. Despite the risk of failure, EU presence in
support of civilian missions via military intervention would strongly increase
the image of the EU in the Middle East.
The Gaza first option serves Israeli interests since it would relieve Israel of
having to maintain a military presence within or around the Strip. However, to
reduce militant threats, Israel would need to consent to the international deployment
of troops on the Israeli side of the border, as well as the opening of
numerous crossing points between Israel and the Gaza Strip, such as Erez, Karni
and Kerem Shalom. Refusing to do so will only frustrate European attempts to
bring security to Israel and stability to the Palestinians. The EU military deployment
must therefore be conditioned by Israeli willingness to allow the physical
opening of all respective crossing points to facilitate economic development. In
turn, this may be in the interest of Israel since it would decrease the incentive for
militant Palestinian activity.
The Palestinians, however, would be highly reluctant to accept the Gaza first
option because it would not include the other part of what remains of Palestine.
Already separated geographically, politically, and legally, opting for Gaza first
would split the Palestinian territories further.17 International intervention must
therefore include final status conditions for the West Bank and Jerusalem, which
are both substantially more complex and symbolic than the Gaza Strip. A final
status settlement would have to include the question of refugees, the status of
Jerusalem, and the national borders between Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian
17 Camille Mansour, Not Without a Political Horizon, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September
18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
New Faces Conference 2006 98
Panel V:
After the Roadmap
territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem – must be treated as one
for the third party mandate to be accepted by the Palestinians.18 If not, the Palestinians
will perceive an international force as a surrogate for Israel.
Many contentious points remain, such as the Palestinian right of return, the
repatriation of refugees, and the border delineation along the Israeli “security
fence” or along the 1948 armistice line. An international force would be deployed
to ensure the total dismantling of the “separation wall.” Territorial swaps could
also ensure that the Palestinians retrieve a portion of land proportional to the
amount they lost in the war of June 1967. Such a territorial swap would permit
Israel to maintain some settlements in the West Bank in exchange for territory
within Israel. All other Jewish settlements would be dismantled since they would
be deemed illegal by international law. As consolidated by Israel prior to and during
the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Greater Jerusalem could subsequently
become an international city as envisioned by the 1947 UN partition plan. Acquiring
international status for the three “people of the Book”—Christians, Jews,
and Muslims—would be seen as a symbolic sign for religious reconciliation and
political coexistence.
Conclusion
The EU offers a viable option for third party intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Because of its potential to compromise member state participation,
this intervention should not be determined by the success level of the UN/multinational
task in southern Lebanon. Rather, it should be seen as a necessary
prerequisite to paving the path for a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
From such a perspective, a longer-term EU peacekeeping mission could then
substitute the rapid deployment of a EU “Battle Group” of 1,500–2,000 European
Member State troops. The initial deployment to the Gaza-Israel border
would provide the security demanded by Israel and the stability needed by the
Palestinians, as well as create the possibility to implement fully the two EU civilian
missions in the Palestinian territories and the Agreement on Movement and
Access signed by Israel and the PA. But as ever, the success of the EU alternative
depends on what Israel will refuse for security reasons and what Palestinians
would accept as national territory.
18 Ghassan Khatib, A Measure of International Seriousness, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?,
September 18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.
Participants and Organizers
99
New Faces Conference 2006
Participants and Organizers
Participants
Gerardo Briceño (Venezuela) is a guest researcher at the Max-Planck-Institute for
foreign and international criminal law in Freiburg, Germany.
Mathieu Briens (France) is Academic Assistant within the Department of EU
International Relations and Diplomacy at the College of Europe in Bruges,
Belgium.
MAJ Jonathan Byrom (USA) is a cavalry officer in the US Army and is currently
serving as an economics instructor and International Security Seminar Executive
Officer in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy,
Westpoint, USA.
Moty Cristal (Israel) writes his PhD on Negotiation Systems at the Department
of International Relations at the London School of Economics, UK.
Bob Deen (The Netherlands) is working as a Project Officer for the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities, The Hague, The Netherlands.
Marcel Gerber (Switzerland) is a Policy Adviser in the Directorate for Security
Policy in the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Berne, Switzerland.
Kristin M. Haugevik (Norway) is a researcher at the Department of International
Politics at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway.
Mohamed Ibrahim (Germany) is working as a Program Manager for InWEnt-
Capacity Building International, Berlin, Germany.
Robert Khorolskyy (Ukraine) is Assistant Professor of International Law and
Constitutional Law of Foreign States at Yaroslav the Wise National Law Academy
of Ukraine, Kharkiv, Ukraine.
Claudia Major (Germany) is currently completing her PhD in European Studies
at the University of Birmingham, UK, and teaches at the Institute for Political
Studies in Paris (‘Sciences Po’), France.
New Faces Conference 2006 100
Participants and Organizers
Karim Makdisi (Lebanon) is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in
the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American
University of Beirut, Lebanon.
Rafeh A. Malik (Pakistan) is working for the Islamabad Policy Research Institute
(IPRI), Pakistan.
Stuart Reigeluth (Belgium/USA) works for the Africa and Middle East Program
at the Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) in Madrid, Spain.
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss (Germany) is a member of the Policy Planning and
Advisory Staff in the German Ministry of Defence in Berlin.
Rashad Shirinov (Azerbaijan) is teaching theories of international relations at
Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
Martin Sjögren (Sweden) is currently working as a Research Assistant within the
project on Euro-Atlantic, Regional and Global Security at the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.
Eduard Soler i Lecha (Spain) is the coordinator of the Mediterranean Programme
at CIDOB Foundation of Barcelona, Spain.
Mehmet Y. Tezcan (Turkey) is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political
Science and Researcher at the Institute for European Studies at Free University
of Brussels, Belgium.
Natalia Touzovskaia (Russia) is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Europe of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.
Zhou Qiujun (China) is a doctoral student of International Relations jointly run
by the School of Advanced International and Area Studies (SAIAS), East China
Normal University in Shanghai and the Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences
Humaines in Lyon, France.
Participants and Organizers
101
New Faces Conference 2006
Organizers
Kathrin Brockmann is Program Officer of the International Forum on Strategic
Thinking.
Hans Bastian Hauck is Head of Program of the International Forum on Strategic
Thinking.
Sverre Lodgaard has been Director of the Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI) from 1997 until 2007.
Fritjof von Nordenskjöld is Executive Vice President at the German Council on
Foreign Relations in Berlin.
Elana Wilson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian Studies at
NUPI.
New Faces Conference 2006 102
Notes
103
New Faces Conference 2006
Notes
New Faces Conference 2006 104
Notes
Impressum
September 2007
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V.
Rauchstraße 17/18
10787 Berlin
Deutschland
Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0
Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16
info@dgap.org
www.dgap.org
Fotos
Konferenzteilnehmer
Satz
Tilmann Chladek
Belichtung und Druck
Bonifatius Druck • Buch • Verlag, Paderborn
ISBN: 978-3-9810553-5-1
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Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie.
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ISBN: 978-3-9810553-5-1
